.  1 829.]  Review  of  Taylor  and  Hartley  on  human  depravity.    343 
Art.  XL — Revikw  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  ox  Human  De- 


r"T?ev,  Jfb(PthyU%-vU. 


Concio  ad  THerum.  A  Sermon  delivered  in  the  Chapel  of  Yale  Collegf. 
Sept.  10,  1828.     By  Nathamkl  W.  Taylor. 

A  Review  of  a  Sermon  delivered  in  the  Chapel  of  Yale  College,  Sept.  10. 
1828;  by  Nathaniel  W.  Taylor,  D.  D.  By  Rev.  Joseph  Harvey,- 
Pastor  of  a  church  in  Westchester,  Conn.     pp.  40.  Hartford  :   1828. 

The  illustrious  Edwards,  early  in  life,  recorded  in  his  diary 
the  remark,  that  "  old  men  seldom  have  any  advantage  of  new 
discoveries,  because  these  are  beside  a  way  of  thinking  they 
have  been  so  long  used  to  :"  and,  to  this  remark,  he  subjoined 
the  resolution,  "  if  ever  I  live  to  years,  I  will  be  impartial 
to  hear  reasons  of  all  pretended  discoveries  and  receive  them, 
if  rational,  how  long  soever  I  have  been  used  to  another  way 
of  thinking."  The  importance  of  the  habit  contemplated  in 
this  resolution,  must  be  obvious  to  all  men,  who  would  not  say 
"  we  are  the  people,  and  wisdom  shall  die  with  us."  Nor  is 
there  less  occasion  for  it  in  theological  inquiries,  than  in 
other  investigations.  There  are,  indeed,  truths  in  theology, 
as  in  physical  science,  which  no  person,  who  has  once  under- 
stood them,  and  in  view  of  their  proper  evidence  has  beconie 
convinced  of  their  certainty,  can  be  supposed  afterwards  to 
doubt.  The  perfection  and  universal  government  of  God,^ 
the  spiritual  and  immutable  obligation  of  his  law,  the  entire 
sinfulness  of  unrenewed  man,  the  deity  and  atonement  of 
Christ,  with  other  doctrines  connected  with  these,  are  so 
clearly  wrought  into  the  christian  system,  are  so  powerfully" 
commended  to  the  conscience,  and  are  so  essentially  invol- 
ved in  each  other,  that  when  they  are  once  received  as  they 
are  exhibited  in  the  scriptures,  they  may  be  expected  to- 
remain,  with  no  hesitation  or  doubt,  forever  established  in  the 
mind.  We  accordingly  find  abundant  historical  evidence, 
that  in  respect  to  these,  real  christians  from  the  first  have 
had  but  one  faith.  But  these  doctrines  have  in  all  ages  been 
accompanied  with  philosophical  speculations,  many  of  which 
have  been  clothed  with  the  authority  of  first  principles ; 
have  been  admitted  without  examination  ;  and  have  had  na 
inconsiderable  influence  in  corrupting  the  simplicity  of  the 
gospel.  It  is  more  especially  in  respect  to  these,  that  the 
Ijver  of  truth,  after  the  example  of  Edwards,  will  hold  him- 
self bound  impartially  to  examine  whatever  doubts  may  be 
suggested  as  to  their  validity  and  correctness.  Whatever  we 
plainly  see  to  come  to  us  with  the  authority  of  "  thus  saith 


344  Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [Junet, 

the  Lord,"  we  are  to  receive  without  a  question  of  its  truth. 
But  whatever  rests  only  on  the  basis  of  human  reasoning, 
whether  it  professes  to  be  an  illustration  of  inspired  declara- 
tions, or  an  inference  from  them,  that,  (however  long  and  con- 
fidently we  have  been  used  to  the  adoption  of  it,)  we  may 
safely  subject  to  rigid  examination. 

It  has  been  extensively  asserted  by  able  theological  wri- 
ters that  the  sin  of  Adam  is  imputed  to  his  posterity  ;  that 
atonement  is  made  for  none  but  the  elect;  and  that  mankind, 
previous  to  regeneration,  have  not  sufficient  power  to  exer- 
cise true  repentance.  These  modifications  of  christian  doc- 
trine are  now  extensively  rejected ;  and  the  testimony  of  the 
bible,  concerning  the  peculiar  relation  of  Adam  to  his  pos- 
terity, the  nature  of  the  atonement,  and  the  ability  of  men  to 
obey  the  will  of  God,  when  stripped  of  the  appendages  which 
had  veiled  it,  shines  out  with  new  splendor  and  power.  That 
there  are  not  still  remaining  in  our  system  speculations  as  re- 
ally erroneous ;  that  a  future  generation  will  not  detect,  in 
the  preaching  which  we  call  orthodox,  a  mixture  of  "  phi- 
losophy falsely  so  called ;"  that  the  river  of  the  water  of  life 
flows  perfectly  pure  from  the  sanctuaries  of  our  God,  and  has 
all  that  restoring  influence  which  it  would  have  were  it  in  no 
degree  adulterated,  is  certainly  not  proved  by  the  confidence 
which  any  one  may  have  that  it  is  so.  We  may  incautiously 
have  received,  as  we  find  that  others  greater  and  better  than 
ourselves  have  received,  human  theories  for  divine  revelation  ; 
and  whoever  comes  to  us  with  any  appearance  of  reason,  to 
show  in  what  particular  we  have  done  this,  deserves  our 
thanks,  and  is  entitled  to  our  careful  and  impartial  attention. 

In  regard  to  the  main  topic  of  the  sermon  now  before 
us,  however,  the  author,  so  far  from  pretending  to  inculcate 
any  "new  doctrine,"  insists  that  it  is  no  other  than  the  doc- 
trine of  standard  Calvinistic  divines  as  maintained  for  centu- 
ries. Nor  does  he  lay  claim  to  a  new  discovery  on  any  other 
point;  although  he  does  incidentally  in  the  sermon,  and  more 
fully  in  a  note,  suggest  reasons  for  questioning  the  truth  of 
certain  commonly  received  principles  respecting  the  Divine 
government.  Yet  that  busy  rumor  with  her  thousand  tongues 
had  gone  abroad,  spreading  insinuations  unfavorable  to  the  or- 
thodoxy of  Dr.  Taylor  in  regard  to  the  main  doctrine  of  the  ser- 
mon,the  complection  of  it,in  some  of  its  parts,most  clearly  shows. 
And  placed  as  he  is  at  the  head  of  one  of  our  most  important 
theological  schools,  and  identifying  his  own  character,  in  a 
considerable  degree,  with  that  of  an  Institution  on  which  so 
many  inestimable  hopes  depend,  we  do  not  wonder  that  he 
should  have  had  deep  sensibilities  on  this  point.     Still,  if  any 


1829.]  on  Human  Depravity.  345 

representations  which  have  been  made,  could  have  furnished 
a  reasonable  cause  for  suspicion  respecting  his  real  senti- 
ments on  this  doctrine,  we  are  as  little  disposed  to  blame  the 
sensibilities  of  others  on  that  account,  as  we  are  to  wonder  at 
his  own.     We  cannot  imagine  the  guardians  of  our  churches 
to  be   too  scrupulous   respecting  a  doctrine  of  this  moment. 
Whether  the  sinfulness  of  our  race  is  natural,  or  the  result  of 
circumstances  merely,  is  a  question  of  vital  importance.     It 
has  a  direct  bearing  upon  the  remedial  system :  and  hence 
the  decision  of  it  which  different  men  adopt,  is  found  to  give 
a  distinctive  character  to  their  whole  scheme  of  faith.     Still 
we  do  think,  that  a  public  teacher  under  the  responsibilities 
of  Dr.  Taylor,  has  no  ordinary  claim  to  christian  candor; 
that  floating  rumors  ought  not  to  be  taken  up  as  the  founda- 
tion of  a  serious  charge  ;  that  he  may  fairly  ask  to  be  heard 
before  he  is  judged.     We,  therefore,  heartily  rejoice,  that  he 
has  embraced  the  favorable  opportunity  given  him  of  coming 
before  the  public  on  this  subject;  and  we  are  equally  gratifi- 
ed to  find  that  Mr.  Harvey,  who  remains  unconvinced  by  the 
statements  of  Dr.  Taylor,  has  brought  forward  his  objections 
in  a  distinct  and  palpable   form.     Mutual  explanations,  we 
apprehend,  will  remove  most  of  the  difliculties  which  exist 
in  Mr.  Harvey's  mind.     At  all  events,  a  temperate  and  can- 
did discussion  of  the  points  at  issue,  will  be  productive  of 
great  good.     Nothing  can  be  more  important  to  Calvinists  at 
the    present   day,    than  to  settle  with  entire  precision    the 
import  of  their  statements  respecting  the  nature  of  sin,  and 
the  ground  of  its  certainty  as  a  characteristic  of  our  whole 
race.     The  use  of  ambiguous  language  on  this  subject,  has 
been    a   prolific    source  of  obloquy   and   error.     There   are 
thousands  among  us,  who  have  the  most  monstrous  and  per- 
verted notions  respecting  the  real  faith  of  Calvinists,  on  these 
points.     Prejudice  has  been  hardened  into  animosity,  and  the 
soul  has  been  steeled,  in  a  multitude  of  instances,  against 
conviction  of  sin  and  the  pursuit  of  eternal  life,  by  a  fatal 
misconception  of  statements  which  were  designed  to  lead  it 
to  God.     The  doctrine  of  man's  entire  depravity  by  nature, 
is  so  humbling  to  the  human  heart — so  apt  in  itself  io  awaken 
opposition,  and  turn  back  the  mind  from  the  only  path  of  safe- 
ty, that  no  unguarded  statements  should  ever  be  interposed, 
to  weaken  the  force  with  which  this  doctrine  comes  down  on 
the  consciences  of  men.     Dr.  Taylor  has  therefore,  in  our 
view,  rendered  an  important  service  to  the  cause  of  evangel- 
ical truth,  by  pointing  out  some  of  these  unguarded  state- 
ments.    And  we  cannot  but  think  that  Mr.  Harvey,  in   re- 
peating those  statements,  and  insisting  that  they  constitute 
14 


346  Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [June, 

an  essential  part  of  the  doctrine  in  question,  has  completed 
the  work  which  Dr.  Taylor  had  begun,  by  holding  them 
forth  to  the  world  in  their  naked  character  and  inevitable  re- 
sults. 

The  text  of  Dr.  Taylor's  sermon  is  Ephesians  ii.  3,  '■^And 
were  by  nature  children  of  wrath  even  as  others."  To  be 
children  of  wrath,  according  to  the  author's  explanation  of 
the  phrase,  is  "  to  possess  the  character  which  deserves  pun- 
ishment; or,  in  other  words,  it  is  to  be  sinners,  or  to  be  en- 
tirely depraved  in  respect  to  moral  character."  From  the 
text  thus  explained,  Dr.  Taylor  derives  the  leading  doctrine  of 
his  discourse,  "  that  the  entire  moral  depravity  of  mankind  is 
by  NATURE."  In  illustrating  this  position,  he  shows  "first,  in 
what  the  moral  depravity  of  man  consists,  and  secondly,  that 
this  is  by  nature."  Under  the  first  head  he  states,  that  "  this 
moral  depravity,  for  which  man  deserves  the  wrath  of  God,  is 
man's  own  act,  consisting  in  a  free  choice  of  some  other  ob- 
ject rather  than  God,  as  his  chief  good."  Here  Mr.  Harvey 
joins  issue  with  the  preacher;  and  maintains  that  there  is  sin 
in  the  human  heart  which  is  not  man's  own  act.  "  And  here 
let  it  be  kept  in  mind,"  he  says,  "  that  the  question  is  not 
whether  voluntary  transgression  is  sin,  or  whether  those  who 
are  capable  of  knowing  the  law  of  God,  sin  voluntarily,  but 
whether  there  is  no  sin  except  such  as  consists  in  a  man's  own 
act."*  In  passing  to  consider  this  question,  three  things 
should  be  kept  distinctly  in  view.  First,  that  both  parties 
mean  by  "sin,"  real  guilt,  or  that  which  deserves  punishment ; 
and  not  some  c\Vi^\\Xy  figuratively  called  sin,  from  its  uniform- 
ly resulting  in  actual  transgression.  Dr.  Taylor  expressly  con- 
fined his  proposition  to  a  "  moral  depravity  which  deserves 
the  wrath  of  God."  Mr.  Harvey  in  controverting  the  state- 
ment, that  this  depravity  "  is  man's  own  act,"  must  of  course 
be  speaking  of  real  guilt,  or  that  which  strictly  deserves 
punishment.  Secondly,  both  parties  mean  by  the  "  sin"  in 
question,  not  merely  a  negation — but  something  positive — an 
actually  existing  state  of  the  human  mnd.  Such,  throughout 
his  whole  discourse,  is  Dr.  Taylor's  meaning  of  the  term  ;  and 
such  too  is  Mr.  Harvey's,  for  he  represents  the  sin  for  which 
he  contends,  to  be  "  the  efficient  and  criminal  cause  of  actual 
sin."f  Nothing  but  a  positive  and  existing  cause,  can  be  ei- 
ther efficjpnt  or  criminal.  Thirdly,  both  parties  agree  that 
"  guilt,"  "  sin,"  "  desert  of  punishment,"  belong  strictly  to  a 
permanent  agent  alone.  Mr.  Harvey  seems  to  imagine,  in- 
deed, that  Dr.  Taylor  considers  a  simple  act  of  the  will  as 

*  Page  7.     t  Page  28. 


1 829.]  on  Human  Depravity.  347 

sinful,  distinct  from  the  agent  who  performs  it.  "  This,"  he 
remarks,  "  would  make  every  sinful  act  a  separate  accounta- 
ble agent,  existing  only  for  the  moment  when  the  action  is 
passing."  But  Dr.  Taylor  is  chargeable  with  no  such  ab- 
surdity as  this.  On  the  contrary,  in  laying  down  the  propo- 
sition condemned  by  Mr.  Harvey,  he  expressly  says,  "  the 
question  then  still  recurs,  what  is  this  moral  depravity  for 
which  MAN  deserves  the  wrath  of  God  ?  I  answer,  it  is  man's 
own  act,  etc."  Such  is  the  uniform  tenor  of  his  discourse — 
the  AGENT  is  guilty  for  acting  contrary  to  the  demands  of 
known  duty.  Such  is  the  ordinary  language  of  mankind  on 
subjects  of  this  nature.  We  say  "  the  act  is  sinful,"  meaning 
that  the  agent  who  performs  it,  is  guilty  for  doing  the  act ; 
and  in  the  ordinary  concerns  of  life,  we  should  never  expect 
a  man  to  misunderstand  language  of  this  kind. 

With  these  explanations,  we  are  brought  at  once  to  the 
point  at  issue  as  stated  by  Mr.  Harvey  himself,  viz.  "  whether 
there  is  no  sin  except  such  as  consists  in  a  man's  own  act." 
If  then  a  man  is  guilty  of  that  which  is  not  his  own  act,  it  is 
natural  to  inquire,  o^ what  is  he  thus  guilty?  Of  the  act  of 
Adam  in  eating  the  forbidden  fruit?  This,  we  presume,  Mr. 
Harvey  will  not  say.  Of  the  act  of  God  in  making  him  what 
he  is,  antecedent  to,  and  independent  of,  his  own  actions  ? 
This  no  one  will  venture  to  affirm.  What  then  remains? 
He  cannot  be  charged  with  guilt  for  what  others  have  done, 
nor  for  the  bare  fact  of  being  that  which  God  has  directly 
or  indirectly  made  him.  It  must  then  be  for  acting,  and 
for  his  "own  act,"  too,  that  any  moral  being  can  possibly 
be  considered  as  guilty.  Such  a  b^ing  can  be  regarded  only 
in  two  points  of  view — the  substance  of  the  soul  with  its  es- 
sential attributes  on  the  one  hand,  and  its  actions  on  the 
other.  If  there  is  sin  in  the  human  mind  previous  to,  and 
independent  of  those  actions,  the  substance  of  the  soul  must 
itself  be  sinful.  If  sin  can  belong  to  any  thing  which  has  ne- 
ver acted,  how  can  we  be  sure  tliat  inert  matter  may  not  be 
sinful  too  ? 

So  clear  is  it  that  action  of  some  kind  is  involved  in  the 
very  idea  of  sin,  that  when  we  read  the  statement  of  Mr.  Har- 
vey for  the  first  time,  we  instantly  concluded  that  some  impor- 
tant word  of  the  sentence  had  been  omitted  by  an  error  of  the 
press — that  he  intended  to  state  the  question  thus,  "  whether 
there  is  no  sin  except  such  as  consists  in  a  man's  own  voluntary 
act."  But  we  found,  in  the  progress  of  his  remarks,  that  the  un- 
qualified statement  which  he  had  actually  made,  was  demanded 
by  the  principles  he  maintains.  Dr.  Taylor's  position  that 
man's  "  nature  is  not  itself  smin\.  and  yet  will  certainly  produce 


348  Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [June, 

sin  and  sin  only,"  is  rejected  by  Mr.  Harvey  as  downright  heresy. 
His  fundamental  principle  is  that  nature  is  itself  sinful — 
"  the  efficient  and  criminal  cause  of  actual  sin."  But  all  agree 
that  the  nature  of  the  human  mind  is  distinct  from,  and  antece- 
dent to,  any  of  its  acts.  It  is  the  nature  of  the  human  soul,  for 
example,  to  perceive,  to  compare,  and  to  judge.  Take  then, 
the  first  act  of  perception  as  it  rises  in  the  mind,  and  we  have 
something  totally  distinct  from  the  nature  or  constitution  of 
the  mind,  which  thus  perceives.  Mr.  Harvey  was  correct 
therefore,  in  his  statement  of  the  point  at  issue  ;  for  he  men- 
tions unequivocally  that  "nature  is  sinful  without  the  act  or 
previous  to  it."*  The  question  then  returns  upon  him  with 
redoubled  force,  how  came  that  nature  in  the  mind  of  man  ? 
Ask  the  same  question  as  to  that  nature  which  determines  us 
to  perceive,  to  compare,  or  to  judge,  and  every  one  replies, 
"  it  was  placed  there  by  God  himself."  In  fashioning  the  sub- 
stance of  the  soul.  He  framed  it  to  be  a  thinking  being,  and 
thus  stamped  upon  it  an  intellectual  nature.  Mr.  Harvey 
must,  therefore,  permit  us  to  say,  that  the  statement,  "  nature 
is  itself  sin(u\,^^  is  only  a  statement  in  other  terms,  that  God, 
the  author  of  nature,  is  the  author  of  sin.  We  are  far,  indeed, 
from  imagining  that  his  mind  ever  assented,  for  a  moment,  to 
so  dreadful  a  conclusion.  But  we  are  constrained  to  say, 
that  he  must  either  abandon  his  fundamental  principle,  or 
that  he  must  not  shrink  from  its  "unavoidable  consequences." 
But  Mr.  Harvey  may  retort  the  question  upon  us,  and  ask 
whence,  upon  our  principles,  does  man  derive  his  moral  na- 
ture 1  We  answer,  without  hesitation,  from  the  hand  of  God 
who  made  him.  By  a  moral  nature  we  mean  the  power  of 
choosing  or  refusing,  in  the  view  of  motives,  and  with  a 
knowledge  of  right  and  wrong.  Such  a  nature  every  account- 
able being  receives  from  the  hand  of  his  Creator.  Angels 
use  it  aright  in  His  service ;  men  uniformly  abuse  it  to  the 
purposes  of  rebellion.  But  in  accounting  for  the  certainty  of 
this  abuse,  we  are  not  to  say  that  man's  moral  nature  is  itself 
sinful  ;  for  no  man,  we  think,  can  say  this  at  the  present  day, 
without  charging  his  sinful  nature  directly  upon  God,  as 
its  author.  No  one  now  believes  that  the  soul  of  the  child  is 
propagated  by  the  parent ;  or  that  the  human  mind  receives 
a  taint  from  its  connection  with  matter.  Every  soul,  as  it  en- 
ters on  existence,  is  a  production  of  creative  power.  He  who 
forms  it,  gives  it  from  the  first,  that  nature  or  constitution 
which  prepares  it  for  action,  when  placed  in  the  appropriate 
circumstances  of  its  being.  And  as  well  might  we  affirm  that 
it  is  the  nature  of  a  stone  to  fall,  and  yet  that  God  is  not  the 

*  Page  25. 


1829.]  on  Human  Depravity.  349 

author  of  gravitation,  as  that  "  nature  is  itself  sinful,"  and 
yet  that  God  is  not  the  author  of  sin.* 

Whence  then  does  it  arise  that  Calvinistic  writers,  even  at 
the  present  day,  are  occasionally  betrayed  into  unguarded 
statements  of  this  kind?  Several  reasons  occur  to  us ;  and 
the  consideration  of  them,  we  think,  may  serve  to  disembar- 
rass the  subject  of  much  perplexity. 

The  first  is,  the  technical  language  of  a  theology  which  is 
now  generally  exploded.  The  statement  of  Mr.  Harvey,  that 
human  nature  is  itself  sinful,  was,  with  few  exceptions,  the 
general  statement  of  Calvinistic  divines,  until  within  the  last 
sixty  or  seventy  years.  Such  statements  were  founded  entire- 
ly upon  one  principle,  viz. ;  that  our  whole  race  were  in  the 
view  of  God,  one  with  Adam;  and  that  his  sin  of  eating  the 
forbidden  fruit,  was  the  sin  of  each  one  of  his  descendants. 
This  utter  confusion  of  personal  identity — this  monstrous  no- 
tion of  sinning  in  the  act  of  another,  has  now  passed  away; 
but  the  traces  which  it  has  left  on  the  current  phraseology  of 
Calvinism,  are  yet  too  apparent.  Educated  in  the  use  of  lan- 
guage framed  upon  this  hypothesis,  there  are  many  who  still 
cling  to  it  with  a  natural  fondness,  while  they  reject  the  doc- 
trine of  imputation  from  which  such  language  was  derived. 
The  old  Calvinists  were  perfectly  aware  that  the  doctrine  of 
a  nature  which  is  itself  sinful,  rendered  them  justly  liable  to 
the  charge  of  making  God  the  author  of  sin ;  unless  that  sin- 
ful nature  could  be  traced  to  Adam  as  its  author,  by  consid- 
ering the  whole  race  as  one  being  with  him,  and  as  sinning  in 
his  first  act  of  rebellion.  It  was  to  save  them  from  this  charge 
that  the  doctrine  of  imputation  was  devised  ;  and  they  never, 
we  believe,  would  have  dreamt  that  any  of  their  followers 
could  reject  that  doctrine,  and  yet  retain  their  statement,  in 
its  literal  import,  that  "  nature  is  itself  sinful."  We  cannot 
but  think,  therefore,  that  Mr.  Harvey  will  find,  on  reviewing 
the  subject,  that  he  has  been  led,  (not  unnaturally,  we  acknow- 
ledge,) into  the  use  of  language  which  cannot  be  justified  at 
the  present  day — that  he  will  see  there  is  no  alternative,  but 
either  to  go  back  to  the  doctrine  of  imputation  ;  or  forward 
to  the  principle  of  Dr.  Taylor,  'that  human  nature  is  not  itself 


*If  Mr.  Harvey  chooses  to  maintain  that  minds  are  propagated,  and  that  sin 
is  transmitted  in  general iim,  it  will  only  remove  the  difficulty  one  step  farther 
back.  For,  we  ask,  who  establislied  the  latcs  of  this  propagation  ?  Can  a  be- 
ing come  into  existence,  of  which  God  is  not  the  author  ?  Every  soul,  then,which 
becomes  united  to  a  human  body,  has  either  existed  from  eternity,  or  has 
been  brought  into  existence  by  God.  And  every  thing  pertaining  to  such 
a  soul,  which  is  not  its  "own  act,"  must  of  necessity  result  from  the  act  of  the 
v^'reator. 


350  Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [June, 

sinful,  while  yet  there  exists  in  that  nature  the  ground  of  an 
entire  certainty,  that  every  moral  act  previous  to  regenera- 
tion, will  be  an  act  of  sin.'* 

It  would  not  indeed,  be  surprising,  if  some  men  should  be 
found  so  wedded  to  the  language  of  an  obsolete  philosophy, 
and  so  eager  to  justify  their  attacks  on  those  who  are  more 
guarded  in  their  statements,  as  even  to  revive,  for  a  time,  the 
doctrine  of  imputation,  with  all  its  absurdity  and  revolting 
consequences.  We  are  very  far,  however,  from  imagining 
that  Mr.  Harvey  believes  that  doctrine.  It  is  a  doctrine,  in- 
deed, which  no  man,  we  are  convinced,  ever  did,  or  ever  can 
believe,  in  the  real  and  practical  sense  of  that  term.  The 
deceptions  which  a  false  philosophy  sometimes  practices  on 
the  strongest  minds,  are  a  striking  exhibition  of  the  weakness 
of  human  nature.  Hume,  for  example,  published  to  the  world, 
and  maintained  by  the  most  subtle  reasoning,  that  there  is  no 
connection  whatever  between  cause  and  effect.  And  yet 
Hume  ate,  drank,  wrote,  and  carried  on  all  the  intercourse  of 
life  like  other  men  ;  on  the  constant  presumption  that  causes 
would  be  followed  by  their  appropriate  effects.  Berkley  de- 
nied the  existence  of  matter,  and  maintained  his  argument  with 
an  acuteness  as  Dugald  Stewart  remarks,  which  has  made  al- 
most every  able  metaphysician,  at  some  period  of  his  life,  a 
convert  to  the  doctrine.  Yet  Berkley  always  acted  like  other 
men  ;  and  was  indeed,  rather  distinguished  for  his  care  in  guar- 
ding his  own  person  against  too  rough  a  contact  with  the  ideas 
around  him.  It  is  thus  that  a  man's  common  sense  sometimes 
overpowers  his  philosophy,  and  furnishes  a  standing  evidence 
that  he  has  never  truly  and  practically  believed  in  the  specu- 
lations which  deluded  his  judgment.  The  subject  of  person- 
al identity  is  attended  with  pecuLar  difficulties  of  this  kind. 
We  may  speculate  upon  it  until  all  onr  ideas  of  permanent 
and  individual  existence,  fade  from  our  view.  In  such  ab- 
stractions, we  may,  as  Edwards  did,  fancy  that  we  be- 
lieve ourselves  to  have  been  one  with  Adam, — to  have  acted 
in  his  act, — to  have  united  in  his  voluntary  choice  of  rebell- 
ion against  God — and  thus  to  have  corrupted  our  own  nature 
in  the  act  that  corrupted  his.  Or  we  may  reason  ourselves 
into  the  notion,  that  there  is  some  magic  in  the  words  "  federal 
head,"  "  representative,"  etc.,  which  can  make  one  moral  be- 


*  It  is  astonishing  to  what  shifts  men  will  resort  to  support  the  doctrine  of 
imputation.  A  distinguished  writer  in  the  nineteenth  century  has  taught  as 
"the  safest  and  most  rational  theory,"  that  allsoulswere  created  at  tlie  begin- 
ning of  the  world,  and  that  they  remain  in  a  quiescent  state  until  the  bodies 
which  they  are  to  inhabit  arc  formed  ! ! 


1829.]  on  Human  Depravity.  351 

ing  truly  guilty  of  the  sin  of  another  ;  and  render  it  not  only 
right  but  necessary,  that  God  should  regard  with  indignation 
and  punish  with  eternal  wrath,  beings  who  have  never  sinned 
in  their  own  person.  Yet,  neither  Edwards  nor  any  other 
man,  has  ever  truly  felt,  that  he  was  guilty  of  Adam's  sin. 
We  may  bewilder  our  minds  with  metaphysical  speculations, 
but  we  cannot  change  the  laws  of  our  spiritual  existence.  He 
who  made  us  distinct  moral  beings,  with  an  intellect  to  under- 
stand, a  will  to  choose,  and  a  conscience  to  feel  the  sense  of 
right  and  wrong,  has  made  it  impossible  for  that  intellect,  or 
will,  or  conscience  to  lose  their  individuality,  or  become 
blended  with  the  being  of  another.  We  should,  therefore, 
do  great  injustice  to  Mr.  Harvey,  in  saying  that  he  believes 
the  doctrine  of  imputation.  Yet  he  has  been  led  by  his  prin- 
ciples, perhaps  unconsciously  to  himself,  to  lay  down  that  doc- 
trine in  the  broadest  terms.  "All  actual  sin,"  he  says,  "  is  vol- 
untary in  him  who  commits  it,  and  all  native  depravity  was 
voluntary  in  the  transgression  o^ Adam,  who  acted  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  his  race."*  Our  "  native  depravity"  which  is  else- 
where pronounced  by  Mr.  Harvey  to  be  "  criminal,"  is  here  ex- 
pressly madea  part  of"  the  transgression  of  Adam, "an  act  which 
took  place  nearly  six  thousand  years  before  we  came  into  exist- 
ence !  We  are  assured  moreover,  that  this  "  native  depravity  was 
voluntary !"  Whether  Mr.  Harvey,  in  saying  this,  adopts  the  the- 
ory of  Edwards,  that  our  personal  identity  was  so  blended  with 
that  of  Adam,  that  we  were  voluntary  in  his  act,  as  constituting 
one  6em^  with  him,  we  cannot  say.  He  may  have  adopted  the 
other  theory,  which  was  rejected  by  Edwards,  that  moral  charac- 
ter is  transferable — that  the  criminality  of  a  representative  be- 
comes the  criminality  of  his  constituents,  and  that  while  Adam 
alone  acted,  and  of  course,  was  alone  voluntary,  all  his  race 
are  literally  deserving  of  punishment  for  what  he  did.  We  are 
inclined  to  believe,  however,  that  Mr.  Harvey,  like  thousands 
who  have  gone  before  him,  used  the  language  quoted  above, 
without  any  very  definite  conceptions  of  its  import.  That 
profound  theologian,  the  late  President  Dwight,  was  accus- 
tomed to  caution  his  students  in  theology,  against  unguarded 
language  as  to  the  representative  character  of  Adam.  His 
views  of  this  subject,  as  stated  in  his  System  of  Theology,  are 
expressed  in  these  positions,  "  that  by  one  man  sin  entered  the 
world,  and  that  in  consequence  of  this  event  all  men  have 
sinned."  These  are  plain  scriptural  statements,  in  which  Dr. 
Taylor  fully  concurs.  But  when  Mr.  Harvey  goes  still  farther, 
and  in  order  to  account  for  this  "  consequence,"  talks  of  a  "  na- 
tive depravity,"  which  "  was  voluntary  in  the  transgression  of 

*  Page  6.. 


352  Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [June, 

Adam,  who  acted  as  the  representative  of  his  race,"  he  carries 
us  back,  at  once,  to  the  most  revolting  statement  of  the  doctrine 
of  imputation.  Tt  is  surely  worth  while  for  him  to  inquire,  whe- 
ther he  has  ever  truly  repented  of  this  "  depravity"  which  was 
not  his  "  own  act,"  but  constituted  part  of  "  the  transgression 
of  Adam."  And  it  is  certainly  time  that  modern  Calvinists 
should  free  their  statements  on  this  subject,  from  a  technical 
phraseology,  which  belies  their  real  sentiments,  and  subjects 
them  to  the  charge  either  of  gross  absurdity,  or  of  making 
God  the  author  of  sin. 

The  second  reason  for  these  unguarded  statements,  is  the 
gratuitous  assumption  that  the  cause  of  a  given  effect,  must 
have  the  same  properties  or  attributes  as  the  effect  itself.  A 
sinful  act,  it  is  said,  can  spring  only  from  a  smful  cause  or 
nature  ;  or,  in  the  language  of  Mr.  Harvey,  "  actual  sin,  then, 
if  it  be  a  certain  and  exclusive  effect,  must  result  from  a  cause 
which  is  sinful."*  If  this  be  so,  it  is  an  obvious  inquiry, 
whence  does  this  sinful  cause  or  nature  itself  arise  ?  That 
too  is  an  effect :  it  has  not  come  into  existence  without  a 
cause,  and  this  cause,  on  the  principle  now  stated,  must  like- 
wise be  sinful.  Thus,  then,  we  have  a  sinful  cause  or  na- 
ture in  the  heart  of  man,  and  a.  preceding  sinful  cause  of  that 
sinful  nature.  What  is  this  preceding  cause  ?  The  old  Cal- 
vinists could  reply,  '  it  was  the  first  sin  of  Adam,  reaching  in 
its  guilt  to  the  extremities  of  the  race,  and  corrupting  the  na- 
ture of  each  individual,  in  the  act  which  corrupted  our  "  federal 
head.'  This,  we  presume,  Mr.  Harvey  will  hardly  maintain, 
notwithstanding  his  unguarded  language  as  cited  above. 
We  are  sure,  at  least,  that  he  can  never  truly  believe  repre- 
sentations of  this  kind.  Whence,  then,  the  question  recurs, 
do  we  derive  this  sinful  nature  ?  In  all  our  inquiries  on 
this  subject,  we  must  at  last  come  back  to  God.  Each 
soul  as  it  enters  on  existence,  receives  its  nature  from  Him  ; 
and  to  affirm  that  this  "  nature  is  itself  sinful,"  and  that  every 
cause  partakes  of  the  character  of  its  effect,  is  not  only  to 
make  God  the  author  of  sin,  but  to  make  Him  sinful  too  ! ! 

We  are  aware,  that  Mr.  Harvey  has  limited  his  remark 
to  such  effects  as  are  "  certain  and  exclusive."  But  a  sin- 
ful nature  is,  in  his  view,  "  certain,"  for  it  constitutes  a  part 
of  every  human  being.  Whether  he  would  pronounce  it 
"  exclusive,"  we  can  hardly  say ;  for  we  are  not  sure  that  we 
understand  his  meaning  in  the  use  of  that  term.  But  certain 
we  are,  that  his  limitation,  whatever  it  may  be,  can  avail  him 
nothing.  Here  are  two  things  which  are  connected  together 
as  cause  and  effect ;  and  the  first,  we  will  suppose,  has  the 

*  Page  29. 


1829.]  on  Human  Depravity.  353 

same  qualities  or  properties  as  the  second.  Whence  then, 
we  ask,  does  this  similarity  arise?  Two  objects  thus  brought 
together,  may  be  accidentally  alike.  But  Mr.  Harvey's  prin- 
ciple, if  it  means  any  thing,  means  more  than  this.  Are  they 
alike,  then,  as  cause  and  as  effect  ?  Obviously  they  are  so  on 
the  principle  of  Mr.  Harvey.  It  is  on  this  very  relation  and  no- 
thing else,  that  he  founds  the  resemblance  in  question. 
The  consequent  has  the  same  properties  with  the  antece- 
dent, because  the  one  is  an  effect  proceeding  from  the  other 
as  a  cause.  Take  away  this  relation,  and  the  similarity  in 
question  ceases  to  exist.  It  is  on  that  relation  alone  that  the 
resemblance  is  founded.  If,  then,  a  given  cause  uniformly 
produces  only  one  effect,  (which,  we  suppose,  is  what  Mr. 
Harvey  means  by  an  "exclusive  effect,")  then  that  cause  will 
have  only  one  class  of  properties  or  qualities,  residing  within 
itself,  and  imparting  a  character  to  the  effect  produced.  But 
if  the  cause  in  question  produces  two,  three,  or  four  different 
effects,  then  it  must  contain  within  itself,  two,  three,  or  four 
distinct  kinds  of  properties,  corresponding  to  the  properties 
developed  in  those  effects.  This  is  intuitively  certain,  if  the 
similarity  in  question  results  from  the  relation  of  cause  and 
effect;  and  we  have  already  seen  that  there  is  nothing  else 
on  which  it  can  be  founded.  Mr.  Harvey's  limitation,  there- 
fore, avails  him  nothing.  If  the  principle  assumed  is  true  at 
all,  every  cause  must  contain  within  itself  the  properties  of 
every  effect  which  it  produces.  God  the  author  of  all  things, 
must  sum  up  within  himself  not  only  all  the  properties  of  the 
material  universe,  but  likewise  of  man's  sinful  nature.  For 
that  nature  not  being  "  man's  own  act,"  must  certainly  be 
the  result  of  creative  power,  unless  a  part  of  the  human  mind 
comes  into  existence  without  any  cause  at  all.  The  only  aP 
ternative  is  that  God  is  sinful,  or  that  effects  may  exist  without 
a  cause — a  principle  which  lands  us  at  once  in  atheism. 

It  is,  indeed,  a  striking  proof  of  Mr.  Harvey's  loose  mode 
of  thinking  on  this  subject,  that  he  asserts,  in  direct  terms, 
that  "  matter,  animals  and  reptiles,"  "  are  not  properly  ef- 
fects !  .'"*  If  we  supposed  him  actually  to  mean  what  he 
says,  we  should  no  longer  doubt  whether  he  could  believe  in 
the  doctrine  of  imputation.  But  the  truth  is,  that  in  penning 
this  statement,  he  was  thinking  of  God's  "  ultimate  end"  in 
creation,  as  an  effect;  when  in  fact  it  is  simply  an  object 
aimed  at — a  result  to  be  produced — and  not  properly  an  ef- 
fect at  all,  in  the  specific  sense  of  that  term.     Misled  by  this 


Page  30, 
45 


354  Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [June, 

erroneous  phraseology,  he  denies  that  "  matter,  animals,  and 
reptiles,"  are  properly  effects.  "They  are  means,"  he  says, 
"  by  which  an  effect  is  produced."  But  if  these  means  are  not, 
in  Mr.  Harvey's  view,  an  effect  of  creative  power,  what  evi- 
dence can  he  find,  in  the  whole  material  universe,  that  there 
is  a  God  ? 

But  let  us  look  for  a  moment  longer  at  this  principle,  that 
"a  certain  and  exclusive  effect"  must  always  have  a  cause, 
which  contains  the  same  properties  as  its  own.  Thinking  is 
"a  certain  and  exclusive  effect"  of  man's  intellectual  nature. 
But  is  there  any  resemblance  between  an  ad  of  thought,  and 
that  constitution  of  mind  by  which  God  enables  us  to  think.? 
Pain  is  "  a  certain  and  exclusive  effect"  of  applying  fire  to 
our  bodily  organs.  But  is  there  any  siiffering  in  the  ele- 
ment of  fire  ?  The  very  examples  adduced  by  Mr.  Harvey, 
refute  his  principle.  A  certain  plant  or  drug  uniformly  de- 
stroys life.  Death,  then, — a  cessation  of  existence  is  the 
effect  produced.  But  is  there  any  property  like  death,  or  a 
cessation  of  existence,  in  the  drug  itself?  No.  But  the 
death  which  follows,  proves  that  the  drug  was  poisonous. 
Exactly  so.  But  poison  is  one  thing,  and  a  cessation  of  ex- 
istence is  totally  another. 

How,  then,  has  Mr.  Harvey,  in  common  with  many  who 
have  gone  before  him,  been  betrayed  into  the  assertion  of  so 
strange  a  principle  ?  The  solution  is  found  in  a  passage 
which  incidentally  occurs  on  the  twenty  third  page  of  his 
Review.  "The  word  cause,"  he  says,  "may  be  used  in  much 
the  same  sense  as  origin  or  source;  and  in  this  sense  it  is 
used  by  those  who  speak  of  nature,  or  the  heart,  as  the  cause 
of  sin."  Now  this  is  never  the  true  or  specific  meaning  of 
the  term  cause.  A  fountain  is  not  the  cause  of  the  water 
which  flows  from  it;  nor  is  the  light  which  fills  the  universe 
an  effect  of  the  sun,  but  simply  a  consequence  of  the  diffusion 
of  its  beams.  Neither  the  fountain  nor  the  sun  have  produ- 
ced water  or  light,  but  have  simply  jwured  them  forth  whea 
already  brought  into  existence.  In  loose  and  popular  dis- 
course, however,  this  confusion  of  terms  does  sometimes  take 
place.  Nor  is  it  productive  of  any  evil,  when  confined  to 
subjects  which  demand  no  great  precision  of  language.  But 
the  misfortune  is,  that  Mr.  Harvey  should  bring  such  loose- 
ness of  statement  into  a  subject  of  this  kind  ;  and  especially 
that  he  should  derive  from  it  a  principle  which  proves  so  ut- 
terly erroneous,  when  applied  to  cause  and  effect  in  the  pro- 
per sense  of  those  terms.  We  go  to  a  fountain  and  take 
from  it  a  quantity  of  water;  and  we  say  that  the  properties  of 
that  fountain  are  the  same  with  those  of  the  water  which  has 


1829.]  on  Human  Depravity.  ^355. 

thus  been  taken.  The  principle  on  which  we  pay  so,  is,  that 
in  a  fluid  of  this  kind,  the  whole  is  similar  to  its  parts;  not 
that  a  cause,  whether  "  exclusive"  or  otherwise,  has  any  re- 
semblance to  its  efTects.  And  we  see  from  this  example,  why 
Mr.  Harvey  was  compelled  to  limit  his  statement  by  the  word 
"  exclusive."  In  relation  to  a  whole  and  hs  parts,  such  a  limi- 
tation is  necessary.  For  if  the  fountain  in  question  had,  by 
some  mechanical  contrivance,  poured  forth  wine  at  one  open- 
ing and  water  at  another,  we  could  not  infer  its  properties 
from  those  of  the  water  alone.  In  other  words,  the  "e^ec?," 
as  Mr.  Harvey  erroneously  terms  it,  must  be  "exclusive,"  or  the 
principle  does  not  apply.  But  we  have  already  seen  that  no 
such  limitation  is  necessary,  or  can  exist  in  the  case  of  a  real 
cause  and  a  real  eft'ect.  If  there  is  any  permanent  ground  of 
a  similarity  of  properties  between  them,  it  is  as  cause  and  as 
effect  that  they  are  thus  similar.  Every  cause  would,  on  that 
supposition,  contain  within  itself  the  properties  of  all  its  sev- 
eral effects ;  and  God,  the  cause  of  all  things,  would  concen- 
trate in  his  own  person  the  discordant  properties  of  the  whole 
universe.  We  see  then  how  Mr.  Harvey  has  been  led  into 
this  error,  A  homogeneous  whole  has,  indeed,  the  same 
properties  with  any  one  of  its  parts,  and  therefore  the  charac- 
ter of  a  fountain  is  known  from  its  streams.  But  no  such 
community  of  properties  exists,  between  a  cause  and  its 
effect :  and  the  existence  of  a  sinful  act  of  choice  does  not, 
therefore,  prove  that  the  nature  by  which  man  is  enabled  thus 
to  sin,  is  "  if seZ/" sinful." 

This  leads  us  to  mention  a  third  reason  of  the  unguarded 
statements  in  question,  viz.  the  ambiguous  use  of  the  words 
source,  fountain,  disposition,  etc.  when  applied  to  moral 
action.  By  the  term  fountain,  for  example,  we  sometimes 
mean  a  body  of  water  ;  and  sometimes  a  cavity  of  earth,  mar- 
ble, or  other  substance  in  which  that  water  is  found.  In  other 
words,  it  denotes  sometimes  the  thing  contained,  and  some- 
times the  container.  It  is  only  in  the  former  sense  that  the 
qualities  of  a  fountain  are  known  from  its  streams:  and  there- 
fore it  is  in  this  sense  only,  that  we  speak,  with  propri- 
ety, of  "a  fountain  of  evil"  in  man,  which  imparts  its  charac- 
ter to  his  actions.  This  fountain,  then,  is  not  the  soul  itself, 
or  its  essential  properties,  because  these  are  the  container, 
and  correspond  to  the  marble  or  the  earth.  It  is,  therefore, 
the  thing  contained,  and  corresponds  to  the  water.  In  other 
words,  it  is  the  desires  and  affections  which  fill  the  human 
soul ;  or  more  exactly,  it  is  that  one  leading  desire,  or  govern- 
ing affection,  which  pervades  them  all,  to  which  all  are  sub- 
servient, and  from  which  all  derive  their  character.     This 


350  Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [June, 

governing  affection  corresponds  to  the  water  which  consti- 
tutes the  literal  fountain ;  and  it  is  this  governing  affection, 
according  to  Dr.  Taylor's  sermon,  which  constitutes  the 
moral  man.  This,  he  maintains,  is  entirely  sinful  from  the 
commencement  of  moral  agency,  until  God  interposes  by  his 
immediate  power  to  change  this  state  of  the  affections, 
and  to  place  them  supremely  on  Himself.  From  this  foun- 
tain all  our  external  actions  spring.  This,  on  the  one  hand, 
is  that  "  good  treasure  of  a  good  heart"  out  of  which  a  man 
"  bringeth  forth  good  things ;"  and  on  the  other,  that  "  evil 
treasure  of  an  evil  heart"  out  of  which  a  man  "  bringeth 
forth  evil  things."  It  is  of  this  that  our  Savior  says,  "  the 
tree  is  known  by  its  fruit ;"  and  that  St.  James  inquires,  "doth 
a  fountain  send  forth  at  the  same  place  sweet  water  and  bit- 
ter ?"  And  not  only  is  this  controlling  affection  or  disposi- 
tion the  source  of  external  actions,  but  likewise,  in  general, 
of  all  those  individual  acts  of  choice,  which  are  continually 
directed  to  the  objects  around  us.  The  avaricious  man,  for 
example,  chooses  those  objects  which  gratify  his  love  of 
wealth ;  the  votary  of  ambition  selects  those  pursuits  which 
minister  to  his  lust  of  power;  the  devotee  of  pleasure  indulges 
his  preference  for  low  and  debasing  objects.  While  the  forms 
in  which  this  governing  affection  shows  itself,  are  thus  various, 
they  all,  previous  to  regeneration,  amount  to  this,  that  selfish 
indulgence  is  the  master  principle  of  the  soul — that  the  world 
in  some  shape,  is  the  supreme  object  of  affection  and 
pursuit.  This  one  principle  leads  the  miser  to  toil  for  wealth, 
the  ambitious  man  to  struggle  for  distinction,  the  sensualist 
to  grovel  in  lust,  and  each  individual  of  our  race,  previous  to 
regeneration,  to  live  in  one  form  or  another,  "  without  God  in 
the  world."  And  in  all  our  estimates  of  moral  character, 
we  go  back  of  the  external  action,  and  even  of  the  immedi- 
ate volitions,  to  this  comprehensive  and  controlling  disposi- 
tion of  the  mind,  from  which  they  all  spring.  This  is  the 
fountain  of  good  or  evil. 

Now  this  governing  affection  of  the  soul,  this  predominant 
inclination  to  right  or  wrong,  is  a  voluntary  state  of  mind. 
We  feel  it  to  be  so  in  every  act  of  sin  and  of  holiness.  We 
know  that  we  acted  freely  ;  that  we  chose  for  ourselves  at  ev- 
ery step;  and  that  no  compulsion,  no  fatal  necessity,  over- 
ruled that  choice.  If  our  governing  disposition  were  not 
thus  voluntary,  it  could  not  have  a  moral  character.  It  would 
be  merely  an  instinct,  like  the  blind  propensities  of  the  brute 
creation.  "The  temper  of  the  mind,"  as  Dr.  Bellamy  truly  states, 
*'  is  nothing  but  the  habitual  inclination  of  the  heart,  but  an 


1829.]  on  Human  Depravity.  357 

involuntary  inclination  of  the  heart  is  a  contradiction."* 
That  this  governing  affection  or  disposition  of  the  soul  is  sim- 
ply a  settled  choice  or  preference,  is  shown  by  an  appeal  to 
facts.  What  is  revenge  for  instance?  Not  the  mere  instinc- 
tive sense  of  injury,  which  results  from  a  consciousness  that 
we  are  wronged.  It  is  only  when  the  ivill  comes  in  and  de- 
cides on  retaliation,  that  the  mind  is  in  that  state  which  we 
denominate  revenge.  What  is  pride  ?  Not  the  mere  estima- 
tion of  ourselves,  but  an  undue  preference  of  our  own  claims, 
when  brought  in  competition  with  those  of  others.  We  might 
thus  analyze  all  the  evil  dispositions  which  belong  to  the 
human  heart,  and  show  by  an  appeal  to  facts,  that  they  are 
me >-eIy  fixed  states  of  choice  or  preference.  No  man,  in  the 
concerns  of  common  life,  ever  supposed  them  to  be  any  thing 
else ,  and  it  is  only  when  he  enters  the  region  of  metaphysics, 
that  the  mind  of  any  one  is  bewildered  on  this  subject.  But 
let  us  hear  Dr.  Taylor  on  this  point. 

And  here  we  come  to  what  I  regard  as  the  turning  point  of  the  whole 
controversy.  So  far  as  I  know,  the  only  argument  in  support  of  the  opin- 
ion that  sin  pertains  to  something  which  is  not  preference,  is  based  in  a 
supposed  decision  of  common  sense.  The  decision  claimed,  is  that  all  par- 
ticular or  specific  sins,  as  fraud,  falsehood,  injustice,  unbelief,  envy,  pride, 
revenge,  result  from  a  wicked  heart, — from  a  sinful  disposition,  as  the 
cause  or  source  of  such  sinful  acts.  To  this  fact,  I  yield  unqualified  as- 
sent, as  "  the  dictate  of  the  universal  sense  and  reason  of  mankind,"  and 
by  this  universal  judgment,  I  wish  the  present  question  to  be  decided. 
Let  us  then  look  at  the  fact  in  its  full  force  and  just  application.  There 
is  a  man  then,  whose  course  of  life  is  wholly  that  of  a  worlding,  his  heart 
and  hand  sliut  against  human  woe,  living  witiiout  prayer,  without  grati- 
tude, unmindful  of  God,  and  rejecting  the  Saviour  of  men,  devising  all, 
purposing  all,  doing  all,  for  the  sake  of  this  world.  Why  is  it  ?  You  say, 
and  all  say,  and  say  right,  it  is  owing  to  his  love  of  the  world — to  his 
worldly  disposition — to  a  heart  set  on  the  world.  Now  while  all  say  this, 
and  are  right  in  saying  it,  we  have  one  simple  question  to  decide,  viz.  what 
do  all  mectn  by  it?  Every  child  can  answer.  Every  child  knows  that  the 
meaning  is,  that  this  man  does  freely  and  voluntarily ^.r  his  affections  on 
worldly  good,  in  preference  to  God  ;  that  the  man  has  chosen  the  world  as 
his  chiif  good,  his  portion,  his  God.  He  knows  that  tliis  is  what  is  meant 
by  a  worldly  heart,  a  worldly  disposition,  which  leads  to  all  other  sins. 
So  when  we  ascribe  the  sins  of  the  miser  to  his  avarcious  disposition,  we 
mean  his  supreme  love  of  money;  or  the  crimes  of  the  hero  or  conqueror  to 
his  ambitious  disposition,  we  mean  his  supreme  love  of  fame,  a  ^itate  of  mind 
which  involves  jjre/ercnce  for  its  object,  p.  12. 

We  might  ask  too  in  this  connection,  what  is  it  that  sin- 
ners are  called  upon  to  do,  when  God  addresses  them,  "  make 
ye  a  clean  heart?"     Is  any  thing  required  but  a  voluntary 


*  Works,  Vol.  I.  p.  155. 


358  Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [Jun'e, 

renunciation  of  the  world,  and  a  settled  choice  of  God,  as  their 
supreme  good  ?  If  this  does  not  constitute  the  change  of  dis- 
position enjoined,  then  that  change  is  not  dependc  nt  on  the 
sinner's  will,  and  is  not,  therefore,  within  his  power.  Dr. 
Bellamy,  therefore,  says  correctly,  that  "  this  voluntary  and 
stubborn  aversion  to  God,  and  love  to  themselves,  the  world, 
and  sin,  is  all  that  renders  the  immediate  influences  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  so  absolutely  necessary,  or  indeed  at  all  need- 
ful."* President  Edwards  in  his  Treatise  on  Religious  Affec- 
tions, lays  down  the  doctrine  for  which  Dr.  Taylor  contends, 
as  the  basis  of  his  whole  system.  "  The  affections,"  he  says,  "  are 
not  essentially  distinct  from  the  will,  nor  do  they  differ  from 
the  mere  actings  of  the  will  and  inclination  of  the  soul,  but 
only  in  the  liveliness  and  sensibleness  of  exercise."f  In  de- 
fining the  nature  of  the  will,  he  states  it  to  be  "  the  faculty  by 
which  the  soul  does  not  behold  things  as  an  indifferent  unaf- 
fected spectator,  but  either  as  liking  or  disliking,  pleased  or 
displeased,  approving  or  rejecting.  This  faculty  is  called  by 
various  names ;  it  is  sometimes  called  the  inclination.  And 
as  it  has  respect  to  the  actions  that  are  determined  and  govern- 
ed by  it,  it  is  called  the  will.  And  the  mind  with  regard  to 
the  exercises  of  this  faculty  is  often  called  the  heart. ''^'!(.  This 
is  the  fundamental  principle  of  Edwards  in  his  Treatise  on 
the  Will,  and  in  all  his  reasonings  upon  sin  and  holiness.  Ad- 
ditional authorities  can  hardly  be  necessary,  but  we  shall  in- 
troduce one  passage  from  Dr.  Woods  of  Andover,  because 
it  is  remarkably  explicit  on  this  point.  Speaking  of  man,  he 
says,  "The  power  of  choosing  right  or  wrong,  makes  him  a 
moral  agent.  His  actually  choosing  wrong,  makes  him  a 
sinner."§  No  language  can  affirm  more  strongly,  that  sin  is 
entirely  the  result  of  choice;  and  of  course  that  there  is  no- 
thing sinful  in  any  disposition,  except  so  far  as  that  disposi- 
tion depends  on  choice  or  preference.  Accordingly,  he 
elsewhere  says  concerning  "  the  natural  appetites,  affections, 
and  passions," — "  now  I  am  as  ready  as  Dr.  Ware  to  affirm 
that  these,  considered  as  original  properties  of  human  nature, 
are  not  sinful,  and  imply  no  guilt."  He  then  proceeds,  after 
expanding  these  remarks,  to  say,  "  But  if  a  man,  in  such  a 
case,  has  a  propensity  or  disposition  to  disregard  the  divine 
command,  and  to  pursue  the  gratification  of  his  own  passions 
as  his  highest  object,  he  has  what  I  mean  by  a  propensity  or 
disposition  to  sin."||  "  The  passions"  thus  gratified,  are  plain- 
ly  "  the   original  properties  of  human  nature"   which  Dr. 


*  Works  1. 161.     t  Vol.  IV.  13    American  Edition,     J  Ibidem.     5  Remarks 
on  Dr.  Ware's  Answer,  p.  44.    ||  Do.  47. 


1829.]  on  Human  Depravity.  359 

Woods  justly  says  "are  not  sinful,  and  imply  no  guilt."  If, 
then,  "the  propensity  or  disposition'''  to  gratify  them  is  sinful, 
that  disposition  can  be  nothing  else  than  an  exercise  of  the 
will  of  man,  because  "  his  actually  choosing  wrong,"  as  Dr. 
Woods  remarks,  '■'■makes  him  a  sinner."  The  sinful  propensi- 
ty or  disposition,  therefore,  for  which  Dr.  Woods  so  properly 
contends  in  his  controversy  with  Dr.  Ware,  is  thus  shown  to 
be  that  "  wicked  heart" — that  "  governing  affection  or  pre- 
dominant inclination  of  the  mind"  spoken  of  by  Dr.  Taylor 
above,  as  that  "which  leads  to  all  other  sins."  "It  is  the 
preference  or  choice  of  man  alone,"  according  to  both  these 
distinguished  theologians,  which  "makes  him  a  sinner." 
How  different  from  the  doctrine  of  Mr.  Harvey,  who  main- 
tains that  "nature  is  ifse//' sinful,"  "  without  the  act  or  previ- 
ous to  it" !  !* 

This  voluntary,  sinful  disposition  is  uniformly  considered, 
throughout  Dr.  Taylor's  discourse,  as  a  permanent  state  of 
mind.  The  whole  tenor  of  his  discourse  indeed,  carries  with 
it  the  full  and  entire  implication,  that  he  regarded  it  as  fixed 
and  permanent  beyond  the  hope  of  change,  except  by  a  di- 
rect intervention  of  almighty  power.  In  the  passage  al- 
ready quoted,  he  represents  man  as  having  "a  heart  se?  on 
the  world"  as  his  "chief  good,"  "his  portion,"  "his  God." 
The  solemn  appeal  to  impenitent  sinners,  with  which  he  con- 
cludes, charges  upon  them  with  overpowering  force,  the  fixed- 
ness of  their  purpose  in  the  ways  of  sin  and  death. 

He  (the  sinnev)  yields  himself  by  his  own  free  act,  by  his  own  choice,  to 
those  propensities  of  his  nature,  which  under  the  weight  of  God's  authority 
\\e  ought  to  govern.  The  gratification  of  these  he  makes  his  chief  good, 
immortal  as  he  is.  For  this  he  lives  and  acts — this  he  puts  in  the  place  of 
God — and  for  this,  and  for  nothing  better  he  tramples  on  God's  authority 
and  incurs  his  wrath.  He  is  going  on  to  a  wretched  eternity,  the  self-made 
victim  of  its  woes.  Amid  Sabbaths  and  bibles,  the  intercessions  of  saints, 
the  songs  of  angels,  the  intreaties  of  God's  ambassadors,  the  accents  of  re- 
deeming love,  and  the  blood  that  speaketh  peace,  he  presses  on  to  death. 


*  Mr.  Harvey  objects  to  Dr.  Taylor's  use  of  the  word  preference,  as  synony- 
mous with  choice.  "  Preference,  lie  says,  is  commonly  understood  to  mean  a 
preponderence  of  estimation  in  favor  of  one  object,  compared  with  another, 
when  both  ma}',  in  a  degree,  be  objects  of  esteem  and  love."  But  do  we  not 
say,  that  a  beggar  would  prefer  even  a  poor  meal  to  nothing  ?  The  word  pre- 
ference, then,  does  not  imply  that  the  thing  refused  is  an  object  of  "  esteem  or 
love."  Dr.  Taylor's  use  of  the  term  is  that  of  Edwards,  and  most  other  writers. 
It  is  the  appropriate  meaning  of  the  word,  in  discussions  of  this  kind.  There  is 
not  in  the  whole  sermon,  a  particle  of  doubt  or  obscurity  on  this  point,  un- 
less the  reader  makes  it  for  himself;  and  we  cannot  but  think  the  spirit  a  very 
unhappy  one,  which  leads  Mr  Harvey,  on  such  grounds,  to  charge  Dr.  Taylor 
with  •'  a  defect  in  doctrine." 


360  Review  of  Taylor  and  Haniey  [June. 

God  beseeching  with  tenderness  and  terror — Jesus  telling  him  he  died 
once  and  could  die  again  to  save  him— mercy  weeping  over  him  day  and 
night— heaven  Hfting  up  its  everlasting  gates — hell,  burning  and  sending 
up  its  smoke  of  torment,  and  the  weeping  and  the  wailing  and  the  gnashing 
of  teeth  within  his  hearing, — and  onward  still  he  goes. — See  the  infatuated 
immortal !  Fellow  sinner, — it  is  you. 

Bowels  of  divine  compassion — length,  breadth,  height,  depth,  of  Jesus' 
love — Spirit  of  all  grace,  save  him, — Oh  save  him — or  he  dies  forever. 
p.  38. 

Who  would  think  it  possible  for  any  man  to  say,  as  Mr. 
Harvey  has  done,  in  reviewing  a  sermon,  which  closed  in  this 
manner,  "  the  doctrine  is  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a 
wicked  heart,  considered  as  a  permanent  source  of  depravi- 
ty."* Mr.  Harvey  could  dwell  upon  this  passage  for  the  sake 
of  exposing  what  he  deems  (we  think  incorrectly)  a  '' rhetor- 
ical" error. f  While  Dr.  Taylor  was  expostulating  with  sin- 
ners on  the  inflexible  obstinacy  of  that  "wicked  heart,"  that 
"sinful  disposition,"  as  he  had  already  called  it,  "which  leads  to 
all  other  sin,"  Mr.  Harvey  could  employ  himself  in  matters 
of  verbal  criticism !  And  in  this  employment,  he  could 
overlook  the  whole  scope  of  the  passage  before  him,  and  lose 
all  recollection  of  the  manner  in  which  he  was  treating  Dr. 
Taylor,  in  saying  of  his  sermon,  "  the  doctrine  is,  that  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  a  wicked  heart,  considered  as  a  perma- 
nent source  of  depravity  ! !"  We  leave  it  to  Mr.  Harvey  him- 
self, and  to  an  impartial  public,  to  apply  such  terms  as  they 
think  proper  to  conduct  of  this  kind. 

We  are  aware,  however,  that  there  are  some  persons,  (and 
Mr.  Harvey  may  be  of  that  number,)  who  find  a  difficulty  in 
understanding,  how  that  which  consists  wholly  in  preference  or 
choice,  can  still  be  permanent.  Though  such  a  difficulty 
could  furnish  no  justification  for  stating  the  doctrine  of  the 
sermon  diametrically  contrary  to  the  fact,  yet  it  may  be  a  suffi- 
cient reason  for  devoting  a  few  moments  to  this  part  of  the 
subject.  We  would  appeal,  then,  to  the  experience  of  the  ob- 
jector, whether  there  is  any  thing  more  inflexible  and  stub- 
born than  the  will  or  purpose  of  one,  whose  decision  has  been 
finally  made.  In  the  ordinary  language  of  life,  we  say  that  a 
man  is  "wilful,"  or  that  "his  will  is  up,"  as  the  most  natural 
mode  of  describing  a  state  of  fixed  and  settled  obstinacy. 
While  this  purpose  remains,  all  individual  acts  of  choice  are 
made  subordinate  to  it.  Besides ;  avarice,  ambition,  pride,  etc. 
as  we  have  already  remarked,  are  voluntary  states  of  mind. 


Tagel5.  tPage40. 


1829.]  on  Human  Depravity.  361 

We  do  not  call  the  instinctive  feelings  from  which  they  spring, 
by  these  names.  It  is  only  when  the  will  comes  in,  when  a 
preference  is  established,  and  the  purpose  of  gratification  is 
formed,  that  pride,  ambition,  or  avarice  exist.  Yet  what  more 
permanent  than  these  states  of  mind!  What  more  hopeless  than 
"the  unconqerable  will  and  study  of  revenge"  !  The  objec- 
tor's difficulty  arises  from  this,  that  he  has  not  sufficiently  dis- 
tinguished between  the  governing  purpose  of  the  soul,  and 
subordinate  acts  of  choice.  Avarice,  for  example,  may  be 
considered  as  n  governing  purpose,  to  those  particular  acts  of 
choice,  by  which  avarice  selects  the  means  of  gratification. 
These  specific  acts  are  all  subordinate  ;  and  may  change  per- 
petually, as  new  objects  are  presented.  But  the  pr^erence 
of  wealth,  and  iha  purpose  to  attain  it,  may  remain  fixed  and 
unalterable.  Now  avarice  is  only  one  specific  form  whicii 
the  comprehensive  governing  affection  of  the  soul  assumes. 
Pride  is  another, — sensuality,  another.  One  is  more  common 
in  age,  another  in  manhood,  and  another  still  in  youth.  They 
may  at  times  be  brought  into  conflict  with  each  other.  A 
momentary  fit  of  pride  may  make  the  miser  generous;  or  the 
spendthrift  may  become  frugal,  from  some  unlooked  for  change 
of  circumstances.  But  in  all  these  conflicts  between  inferior 
principles,  the  one  comprehensive,  controlling  affection  which 
pervades  them  all,  remains  unchanged  as  "  the  ordinances  of 
heaven."  This  consists  in  the  supreme  love  of  the  world  in 
some  form — the  settled  preference  of  its  "good  things,"  to  the 
exclusion  of  God,  as  the  highest  object  of  the  soul — and  a  de- 
termined purpose  to  obtain  this  object,  which  never  yields 
except  to  the  intervention  of  almighty  power. 

There  was  no  occasion,  therefore,  for  Mr.  Harvey  to  sneer 
at  Dr.  Taylor,  on  the  subject  of  a  new  translation  of  the  scrip- 
tures; or  to  tell  us  that  David,  instead  of  praying  'create  in 
me  a  clean  heart,'  should  have  said,  "  create  in  me  a  clean 
act."  A  permanent  state  of  voluntary  affection  or  choice,  is 
totally  distinct  from  particular  acts  of  the  will.  It  is  a 
governing  purpose  or  disposition  of  the  soul ;  and  if  the 
change  for  which  David  prayed,  and  which  God  enjoins  on 
every  sinner,  when  he  says,  "  make  you  a  new  heart,"  is  not  a 
change  in  this  governing  state  of  the  will,  it  is  not,  in  any 
sense,  within  the  power  of  man.  If,  then,  Mr.  Harvey  does 
not  renounce  the  distinction  between  natural  and  moral  abili- 
ty and  inability,  it  would  be  more  consistent  for  him,  perhaps, 
to  spare  his  sneers  on  this  subject.  At  all  events,  he  should 
first  answer  President  Edwards,  who  as  we  have  already  seen 
lays  it  down  as  the  foundation  of  his  work  on  the  Affections, 
that  the  will  and  the  heart  are  the  same  thing;  and  of  course 
46 


362  Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [June, 

that  a  change  of  heart  consists  in  a  permanent  change  of  the 
governing  state  of  the  will.  Nor  does  the  permanency  of  this 
state  consist  in  the  standing  and  perpetual  exercise  of  that 
single  comprehensive  volition.  The  simple  fact  is,  and  we 
see  it  in  the  daily  concerns  of  life,  that,  in  some  cases,  when 
a  man  has  once  formed  his  purpose,  he  adheres  to  if.  All  his 
other  acts  of  choice  are  either  subservient  to  this  decision, 
or  at  least,  not  inconsistent  with  it.  This,  then,  is  his  go- 
verning purpose;  and  this  in  the  heart  of  man  before  regene- 
ration, is  the  choice  of  the  world  as  the  highest  object  of 
regard.  This,  according  to  Dr.  Taylor's  sermon,  while  sinful 
in  itself,  is  the  fountain  of  all  other  sin;  and  this  consists 
wholly  in  "man's  own  act." 

But  on  Mr.  Harvey's  principles,  there  is  another  fountain  of 
evil  back  of  this,  which  does  not  consist  in  "  a  man's  own  act." 
This  fountain,  then,  is  not  the  thing  contained,  but  the  con- 
tainer. It  corresponds,  not  to  the  water  which  supplies  the 
streams,  but  to  the  cavity  of  earth  or  marble  in  which  that  wa- 
ter reposes.  And  here,  we  apprehend,  is  precisely  the  ground 
of  Mr.  Harvey's  error.  The  source  or  fountain  to  which  Dr. 
Taylor  alludes,  has  the  same  qualities  with  the  streams  which 
issue  from  it.  But  the  source  or  fountain  contended  for  by 
Mr.  Harvey,  cannot,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  have  the  pro- 
perties of  that  which  is  contained  within  it.  Who  ever  im- 
agined that  a  marble  fountain, or  a  cavity  of  earth,  had  any  of 
the  properties  of  water?  And  who  will  maintain  that  the  sub- 
stance of  the  soul,  or  its  nature  and  constitution,  are  sinful, be- 
cause its  free  acts  of  choice  have  that  character  ?  The  former 
are  necessary  to  lay  the  ground  of  moral  action,  and  are  the 
direct  product  of  creative  power;  the  latter  are  the  man's 
own  acts,  and  for  these  alone  is  he  responsible.  When  the 
former  are  spoken  of  as  the  source  of  moral  action,  the 
word  source  is  used  in  a  totally  different  sense,  from  its 
acceptation  when  we  speak  of  a  fountain  as  partaking  of  the 
character  of  its  streams.  Yet  Mr.  Harvey,  from  confounding 
these  two  senses,  insists  that  "  nature  is  itself  sinful,"  be- 
cause the  voluntary  actions  of  the  human  soul  have  this  cha- 
racter.    How  obviously  is  he  misled  by  his  own  ambiguous 


se 


langua 

There  is  a  similar  ambiguity,  too,  in  the  use  of  the  words  ten- 
dency, propensity,  disposition, principle,  etc.  These  words,  as 
we  have  seen  already,  are  used  extensively  to  denote  voluntary 
states  of  mind — a  fixed  purpose,  orsettled  p'c/"e/*enceof  the  soul. 
In  this  sense  they  are  sinful  or  holy;  and  impart  their  own  cha- 
racter to  all  those  individual  acts  of  choice,  which  are  subordi- 
nate to  them.   But  there  are,  likewise,  in  the  constitution  of  the 


1829.]  on  Human  Depravity.  363 

mind,  certain  other  propensities,  tendencies,  or  principles, 
which  lie  back  of  moral  action,  and  belong  to  us  simply  as  in- 
tellectual and  sentient  beings.  Of  this  class  are  the  natural  ap- 
petites, as  hunger,  thirst,  etc.  the  social  affections,  as  love  of 
children,  sensibility  to  the  opinions  of  others,  a  feeling  of  in- 
jury when  wronged,  sympathy  with  the  suflerings  of  others,  etc. 
and  connected  with  them  all,  is  the  desire  of  happiness,  which 
belongs  to  us  in  common  with  all  sentient  beings.  Now  these, 
from  the  nature  of  the  case,  are  neither  sinful  nor  holy.  They 
result  from  the  inevitable  condition  of  our  being;  and  we  can 
no  more  cease  to  be  subjects  of  them,  than  we  can  cease  to 
exist.  All  that  is  demanded  by  the  claims  of  duty,  is  to  keep 
them  in  strict  subjection  to  the  rights  of  other  beings — to  our 
obligations  to  God  and  to  our  fellow  creatures.  Each  of 
these  constitutional  propensities  has  some  specific  object  to 
which  it  is  directed  ;  and  we  have  no  way  of  describing  such 
a  propensity,  but  by  directing  the  inquirer  to  that  object. 
Thus,  if  we  are  asked,  what  is  hunger,  we  can  reply  only  by 
pointing  to  its  appropriate  object,  and  saying  it  is  the  desire  of 
food.  What  is  sympathy  ?  It  is  pain  in  the  view  of  the 
sufferings  of  others.  Thus  it  is  that  these  constitutional  pro- 
pensities, lie  at  the  foundation  of  every  thing  that  we  call  a 
motive.  Any  external  object  becomes  a  motive  to  us,  by 
becoming  an  object  towards  which  one  of  these  constitutional 
propensities  is  directed.* 


*  The  voluntary  propensities  have  likewise  their  appropriate  external 
motives.  Thus,  to  an  ambitious  man,  an  opportunity  to  injure  a  rival  be- 
comes a  motive  to  action.  But  if  the  inquiry  is,  how  the  voluntary  state 
of  mind  called  ambition,  became  predominant  in  the  soul,  we  must  go  back 
to  the  constitutional  dc-sire  for  the  approbation  of  our  fellow  men.  We 
here  see  the  purpose  formed  to  indulge  this  desire  even  at  the  expense  of 
the  happiness  of  others,  and  in  defiance  of  God's  commands.  This  purpose 
is  ambition. 

And  here  we  are  led  to  notice  a  very  common  error  of  Unitarian  writers 
on  this  subject.  Mr.  Walker  of  Charlestown,  for  example,  says  in  the 
Liberal  Preacher,  Vol.  I.  No.  II.  when  speaking  of  a  "  revengeful  tem- 
per," •'  an  avaricious  disposition,"  etc.  "  the  vice  does  not  consist  in  the 
feeling  itself,  but  in  its  being  permitted  to  become  inordinate."  This,  we 
conceive,  is  a  palpable  and  destructive  error.  "  T\\e feeling  itself"  of  re- 
venge or  of  avarice,  is  always  sinful,  even  in  its  slightest  exercise.  To 
teach  any  thing  diiferent  from  tliis,  is,  we  apprehend,  to  annihilate  the 
distinction  between  right  and  wrong.  The  feeling  is  not  revenge  or  ava- 
rice, until  the  voluntary  affection  of  the  soul  denoted  by  these  terms,  ex- 
ists in  the  mind.  This  voluntary  affection  differs  not  in  degree  merely,  but 
in  kind,  from  the  preceding  constitutional  propensity  out  of  which  it  sprung. 
The  one  is  a  fixed  choice  or  preference^  the  other  a  mere  impulse  of  our 
nature.  Mr.  Walker's  doctrine  that  "  the  vice  does  not  consist  in  the 
feeling  itself,"  must  give  some  alarm.,  we  think,  tff  every  reflecting  man  of 


364  Review  of  Taylar  and  Harvey  [June, 

Now  there  are  some,  who,  misled  by  the  double  sense  of  the 
terms  propensity,  tendency,  etc.  ima<2;ine  that  these  constitu- 
tional feelings  are  sinful,  because  voluntary  propensities  are 
of  this  character.  Hence  Dr.  Taylor  was  led  to  state  so  em- 
phatically,that  these  constitutional  propensities,  even  in  their 
highest  state  of  excitement,  are  not  in  themselves  sinful.  The 
sin  lies  wholly  in  that  act  of  will  or  choice,  which  decides  on 
their  gratification  against  the  demands  of  known  duty.  Or,  as 
Dr.  Woods  remarks  of  a  moral  agent :  "  His  actually  choosing 
wrong  makes  him  a  sinner"  in  such  a  case. 

The  number  is  not  great,  however,  we  believe,  of  those  who 
think  these  constitutional  propensities  to  be  in  themselves  sinful. 
But  there  are  many  who  have  a  confused  idea,  that  there  must 
be  in  man  some  distinct  and  specific  tendency  to  sin,  previous 
to  all  acts  of  choice  ;  as  there  is  a  tendency  to  food,  to  drink, 
and  to  the  pursuit  of  happiness.  This  they  consider  as  a  part 
of  man's  nature,  like  the  constitutional  propensities  already 
spoken  of;  and  they  of  course  consider  it  as  sinful,  and  de- 
serving of  punishment.  Such  we  should  imagine  to  be  Mr. 
Harvey's  meaning,  when  he  states  that  "  nature  is  itself  sinful." 
But,  if  this  is  his  meaning,  the  question  returns  upon  him,  how 
came  this  tendency  in  the  human  soul  ?  The  man  has  not  pro- 
duced it ;  for  the  tendency  claimed,  is  previous  to  all  acts  of 
choice,  and,  according  to  ]VIr.Harvey,is  previous  even  to  any  act 
of  the  man  at  all.  Every  other  tendency  of  the  soul,  which  is 
thus  prior  to  choice,  is  acknowledged  by  all  to  have  proceed- 
ed directly  from  the  hand  of  God.  This  tendency,  if  it  exists  at 
all,  is  a  positive  existence,  a  real  entity ;  for  Mr.  Harvey  de- 
scribes it  as  the  "efficient  and  criminal  cause  of  actual  sin." 
How  has  it  come  into  being  ?  The  alternative  is  again  before 
those  who  hold  this  doctrine,  viz.  it  either  has  no  cause,  or  God 
is  its  author,  and  is  therefore  the  efficient  author  of  sin. 

But  is  it  really  so?  Ts  there  in  man  a  specific  craving  for  sin, 
as  there  is  for  food  or  drink  ?  Why  then  is  it  wrong  to  be  the 
subject  of  it  ?  How  is  it  possible  not  to  be  the  subject  of  it  at 


his  party.  Let  tlie  principle  be  acted  upon  in  tlie  streets  of  Cliarlestown 
or  Boston,  tliat  "the  feeling  itself"  of  avarice  or  revenge  is  not  a  "  vice," 
and  Mr.  Walker  would  soon  see  the  tremendous  consequences  of  his  doc- 
trine. As  the  scriptures  have  not  taught  us  how  murk  avarice  or  revenge 
we  may  properly  exercise,  men  would  differ  greatly  in  their  views  of  what 
is  really  "  inordinate."  The  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  case,'would 
be  thought  by  each  individual  to  justify  an  indulgence  of  tliese  i■ecliug^^,in 
the  full  extent  to  which  he  had  carried  "it.  If  tlie  man  was  sincere  in  this 
opinion,  could  Mr.  Walker  condemn  him  or  not?  If  not,  then  mankind  are 
given  up  to  promiscuous  wickedness,  provided  they  are  only  sincere  m 
thinking  that  tliey  do  not  carry  it  too  far. 


1829.]  on  Human  depravity.  365 

least  to  some  extent?  Is  it  not  certain,  then,  that  there  is  in  our 
nature  no  such  specific  tendency  to  sin,  corresponding  to  our 
natural  and  constitutional  propensities  ?  Besides,  each  of  those 
propensities  is  directed  to  its  appropriate  object  as  a  good.  But 
is  mere  sin  regarded  by  the  mind  as  a  good,  in  itself  considered^ 
Is  there  in  the  original  constitution  of  the  human  soul,  any  such 
thing  as  a  simple,  disinterested  love  of  sinning,  for  its  own  sake^ 
On  the  contrary,  are  we  not  always  conscious  of  being  in  pur- 
suit of  some  worldly  good,  when  we  sin?  Are  we  not  seeking 
the  gratification  of  our  natural  appetites  and  desires,  or  of  that 
voluntary  disposition  already  spoken  of,  to  find  our  happiness 
in  "  the  lust  of  the  flesh,  the  lust  of  the  eye,  and  the  pride  of 
life  ?" 

But  there  is  one  remaining  difficulty  in  the  minds  of  ma- 
ny persons,  respecting  this  voluntary  propensity  or  disposi- 
tion to  sin.  How  does  it  happen  that  all  human  beings,  from 
the  commencement  of  moral  agency,  uniformly  acquire  this 
propensity  or  disposition?  This  leads  us  to  the  fourth  reason 
of  the  unguarded  statement  that  human  "nature  is  itself  sin- 
ful ;"  viz.  a  hasty  assumption,  that  the  certainty  of  man's  en- 
tire sinfulness  from  the  commencement  of  moral  agency,  can- 
not be  accounted  for  without  supposing  a  sinful  nature.  On 
this  Mr.  Harvey  insists  in  various  forms,  and  with  great  ear- 
nestness. But  on  what  principle  does  this  assumption  rest? 
Obviously  on  this,  that  a  cause  must  have  the  same  proper- 
ties as  its  effect ;  or  in  the  words  of  Mr  Harvey,  "that  actual 
sin,  if  it  be  a  certain  and  exclusive  effect,  m.ust  result  from  a 
cause  which  is  sinful."  But  we  have  already  shown,  that  this 
principle  is  totally  erroneous.  Acts  of  thought,  for  example, 
are  the  certain  and  exclusive  effect  of  our  intellectual  nature. 
Yet  that  nature  is  one  thing,  and  acts  of  thought  are  entirely 
another.  The  truth  is,  that  the  certainty  of  an  effect  is  in  no 
degree  dependent  on  our  being  acquainted  with  the  qualities 
of  its  cause.  The  nature  of  gravitation  is  wholly  unknown, 
but  the  certainty  of  its  eftects  remains  unimpaired  by  our  ig- 
norance. The  results  in  optics  are  the  same,  whether  we  con- 
sider light  as  a  fluid  or  a  vibration.  The  facts  in  electricity  are 
unaltered,  whether  we  adopt  the  theory  of  Franklin,  or  of  Da- 
vy. In  the  case  before  us,  we  have  only  to  inquire  whether 
the  fact  is  not  certain,  that  mankind  do  uniformly  sin,  from 
the  commencement  of  moral  agency  until  their  affections  are 
renewed  by  the  influence  of  divine  grace.  To  us  it  appears 
most  clear  that  they  do,  both  from  the  testimony  of  experience 
and  of  the  word  of  God.  There  must  be,  then,  some  perma- 
nent ground  of  this  uniformly  existing  fact.  But,  if  we  never 
should  discover  what  that  ground  is,  the  certainty  of  the  fact 


360  Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [June, 

would  remain  unaltered.  As  to  a  great  proportion  of  facts  in 
the  natural  world,  we  are  actually  in  this  state  of  ignorance. 
Who  can  describe  the  process  on  which  the  growth  of  an  ani- 
mal or  vegetable  depends  ?  We  talk  of  vegetable  or  animal  life 
as  the  cause  ;  but  these  words  convey  to  us  no  idea  of  the  pro- 
cess in  question,  or  of  the  nature  of  the  cause  supposed.  And 
when  Lord  Monboddo  insists  that  these  causes  are  distinct  en- 
tities, and  that  there  are  in  the  universe  four  kinds  of  souls, 
the  material,  the  vegetable,  the  animal,  and  the  intellectual — 
some  of  which  have  only  orectic,  while  others  are  possessed  of 
gnostic  powers,  we  merely  smile  at  his  absurdity  and  set  his 
theories  aside.  We  look  with  a  graver  aspect  on  the  theory 
of  Mr.  Harvey,  because  it  brings  reproach  and  misconcep- 
tion on  one  of  the  most  important  doctrines  of  our  faith. 
And  when  Dr.  Taylor  puts  down  this  theory  by  unanswera- 
ble reasoning,  it  is  quite  as  ridiculous  for  Mr.  Harvey  to  ex- 
claim, 'then  all  ground  of  the  certainty  of  sin  is  annihilated,' 
as  it  would  be  for  Lord  Monboddo  to  insist,  when  his  newly 
invented  souls  were  brushed  aside,  that  all  certainty  of  coming 
events  was  destroyed,  in  the  material  universe.  But  let  us 
look  at  facts.  Angels  sinned.  Was  the  cause  which  led  to 
their  first  act  of  rebellion,  in  itself  sinful  ?  Eve  was  tempted, 
and  fell.  Was  her  natural  appetite  for  food,  or  her  desire  for 
knowledge — to  which  the  temptation  was  addressed — a  sin- 
ful feeling?  And  why  may  not  our  constitutional  propensi- 
ties now,  lead  to  the  same  result  at  the  commencement  of 
moral  agency,  as  was  actually  exhibited  in  fallen  angels  and 
our  first  parents,  even  when  advanced  in  holiness?  A  child 
enters  the  world  with  a  variety  of  appetites  and  desires, 
which  are  generally  acknowledged  to  be  neither  sinful  nor 
holy.  Committed  in  a  state  of  utter  helplessness  to  the  assiduity 
of  parental  fondness,  it  commences  existence,  the  object  of 
unceasing  care,  watchfulness,  and  concession,  to  those  around 
it.  Under  such  circumstances  it  is,  that  the  natural  appe- 
tites are  first  developed ;  and  each  advancing  month  brings 
them  new  objects  of  gratification.  The  obvious  conse- 
quence is,  that  self  indulgence  becomes  the  master  principle 
in  the  soul  of  every  child,  long  before  it  can  understand  that 
this  self  ndulgence  will  ever  interfere  with  the  rights,  or 
entrench  on  the  happiness  of  others.  Thus  by  repetition 
is  the  force  of  constitutional  propensities  accumulating 
a  bias  towards  self-gratification,  which  becomes  incredi- 
bly strong  before  a  knowledge  of  duty  or  a  sense  of  right 
and  wrong,  can  possibly  have  entered  the  mind.  That 
moment — the  commencement  of  moral  agency,  at  length  ar- 
rives.    Does   the  child  now  come  in  a  state  of  perfect  neu- 


1829.]  on  Human  Depravity.  367 

fralily,  to  the  question,  whether  it  will  obey  or  disobey  the 
command,  which  cuts  it  off  from  some  favorite  gratification? 
If  the  temptation  presented  to  constitutional  propensities, 
could  be  so  strong  in  the  case  of  Adam,  as  to  overpower  the 
force  of  established  habits  of  virtue  in  the  maturity  of  his 
reason,  how  absolute  is  the  certainty  that  every  child  will 
yield  to  the  urgency  of  those  propensities,  under  the  redoub- 
led impulse  of  long  cherished  self-gratification,  and  in 
the  dawn  of  intellectual  existence !  Could  the  uniform  cer- 
tainty of  this  event  be  greater,  if  the  hand  of  Omnipotence 
were  laid  upon  the  child  to  secure  the  result?  Why,  then,  is 
he  sinful  ?  Because,  in  every  instance,  where  guilt  is  char- 
ged in  the  unerring  record  of  God,  the  incipient  moral  agent 
had  attained  to  a  knowledge  of  duty,  and  possessed  full 
power  to  resist  the  temptation,  and  to  obey  the  command. 
At  what  moment  this  period  of  moral  agency  commences,  it 
is  not  for  us  to  say.  We  see  no  evidence,  however,  that  a 
knowledge  of  the  existence  or  moral  government  of  God,  is 
essential  to  such  a  state.  The  parent  may  for  a  time  sus- 
tain the  highest  relations  which  the  mind  of  the  child  is  able 
to  comprehend.  And  whenever,  by  looks  or  actions,  a  com- 
mand can  be  made  to  reach  a  sense  of  right  and  wrong  awa- 
kened in  the  heart,  at  that  moment  the  dawn  of  moral  agency 
has  commenced.  Why,  then,  is  it  necessary  to  suppose 
some  distinct  evil  propensity — some  fountain  of  iniquity  in  the 
breast  of  the  child  previous  to  moral  action  ?  It  is  a  sound 
principle  of  philosophy  never  to  presume  the  existence  of 
more  causes  than  are  necessary  to  account  for  the  effect. 
And  in  the  present  instance,  we  are  forbidden  to  do  it,  by  the 
imputation  which  it  brings  on  the  character  of  our  Creator. 
In  accordance  with  these  views,  President  Edwards  says  of 
his  opponent,  "  he  supposes  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  to 
imply  some  positive  influence — some  quality  or  other  not 
from  the  choice  of  owr  minds,  (how  explicit  is  Edwards  in  say- 
ing that  sin  lies  wholly  in  olr  choice  !)  but  like  a  taint,  tinc- 
ture, or  infection  altering  the  natu7'al  constitution,  faculties, 
and  dispositions  of  the  soul.  Whereas  truly  our  doctrine 
neither  implies  nor  infers  any  such  thing."*  How  diflerent 
from  the  statements  of  Mr.  Harvey! 

We  think,  too,  that  the  account  given  by  the  apostle  James 
of  the  process  of  temptation,  is  perfectly  accordant  with  our 
explanation,  as  offered  above.  "Every  man  is  tempted  when 
he  is  drawn  away  of  his  own  (Ecrifiufjuiag)  lust,  and  enticed." 
The  word  lust  in  this  passage,  as  Mr.  Harvey  acknowledges.. 

^;^  Vol,  VI.  p.  487, 


.368  Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [Junk- 

denotes  merely  "vehement  desire,"  "and  implies  in  itself  no- 
thing necessarily  criminal."  It  is  applied  to  the  feelings  of 
our  Savior  himself,  "  with  desire  have  1  desired,"  etc.  Now  this 
vehement  desire  is  all  that  the  apostle  mentions  as  existing  in 
temptation.  "  Then,"  he  adds,  "when  desire  hath  conceived. 
jT  bringeth  forth  sin,"  etc.  But  Mr.  Harvey  takes  the  liberty 
to  introduce  one  thing  more  into  the  process,  which  the 
apostle  has  not  mentioned;  viz.  "the  principle  of  depravity  in 
the  heart."  "This,"  he  says,  "  exerts  an  efficient  influence 
even  in  the  conception  of  sin."  But  the  apostle  says  no  such 
thing ;  and  on  what  authority  does  Mr.  Harvey  add  to  the 
words  of  inspiration?  Solely  on  his  own  assertion,  that  vehe- 
ment desire  "  will  never  conceive  sin  by  itself."  But  why  not: 
Did  not  vehement  desire  produce  sin  in  Adam's  first  act  of  trans- 
gression? Was  there  any  previous  "principle  of  depravity"  in 
him?  Why  then,  may  not  strong  constitutional  desires  be  fol- 
lowed noiv  by  a  choice  of  their  objects  as  well  as  in  the  case  of 
Adam  ?  And  when  an  apostle  undertakes  professedly  to  des- 
cribe the  process  of  temptation,  who  shall  dare  to  add  to  his 
words  ?  Besides, wc  are  told  expressly,  that  Christ  was  "  tempt- 
ed in  ALL,  points  like  as  we  are."  Now  we  know,  that  nothing 
but  the  natural  appetites  and  constitutional  propensities  could 
have  been  the  source  of  temptation  to  Him.  Is  it  not  demon- 
strably certain  then,  from  the  apostle's  words,  that  these  pro- 
pensities are  the  original  source  of  our  temptations  to  all  sin  ? 
Mr.  Harvey  most  strangely  misrepresents  Dr.  Taylor  on  this 
subject.  .He  assumes  it  to  be  a  part  of  the  doctrine  maintain- 
ed in  the  sermon,  that  the  constitutional  propensities  become 
sinful  in  themselves,  when  they  have  risen  to  a  certain  degree 
of  excitement.  Hence  he  says,  "  there  must  be  a  gradual  ap- 
proach  towards  a  sinful  state.  And  there  must  be  a  time  when 
this  desire  is  passing  the  line  between  the  two  moral 
states."*  And  this  he  says  in  the  face  of  Dr.  Taylor's  declar- 
ation :  "  Nor  does  any  degree  of  excitement  in  these  pro- 
pensities or  desires,  not  resulting  in  choice,  constitute  moral 
depravity."  (page  6.)  He  says  it  too,  knowing  and  stating 
the  fundamental  doctrine  of  the  sermon  to  be,  that  sin  consists 
wholly  in  acts  of  choice  !  Nor  has  he  stopped  here.  He  has 
actually  assumed  that  Dr.Taylor  considers  these  propensities  in 
their  uncxcited  state  to  be  holy ! !  For  thus  he  reasons.  "  And 
there  must  be  a  time  when  this  desire  is  passing  the  line  be- 
tween the  two  moral  states,  consequently  when  it  is  neither 
holy  nor  sinful,  but  partakes  in  exactly  equal  proportions  of 
the  two  moral  principles" ! !  It  is  amazing,  it  is  humiliating 

Pao;e  12. 


1829.]  on  Human  Depravity.  360 

that  a  minister  of  the  gospel  who  comes  forward  through  the 
medium  of  the  press,  to  guard  the  public  against  the  errors  of 
another,  should  himself  fall  into  such  flagrant  misrepresen- 
tations !  We  do  not  suppose  that  Mr.  Harvey  intended  to 
*'  bear  false  witness  against  his  neighbor."  But  on  this,  as 
well  as  on  other  points,  he  has  sent  forth  to  the  world  a  represen- 
tation of  Dr.  Taylor's  sentiments,  as  opposite  to  the  fact  as 
light  is  to  darkness.  This  representation  will  be  read  proba- 
bly by  hundreds,  who  will  never  see  the  sermon.  It  will  be 
taken  as  truth ;  and  may  create  in  the  minds  of  many, 
jealousy,  suspicion,  and  alienation  of  feeling  towards  an  In- 
stitution, which  now  stands,  where  it  has  ever  stood,  on  the 
rock  of  New-England's  early  faith.  For  these  consequen- 
ces he  alone  is  answerable.  An  impartial  public  will  judge 
whether  such  misrepresentations  are  the  result  of  a  mind  too 
prejudiced  to  see  facts,  or  too  inaccurate  to  state  them 
aright.  We  make  these  remarks  without  any  unkindness 
of  feeling.  Towards  Mr.  Harvey  personally,  we  have  al- 
ways cherished  sentiments  of  regard.  As  a  firm  supporter 
of  public  morals,  and  an  energetic  preacher  of  the  gospel 
of  Christ,  he  has  long  had  our  unmingled  respect.  What  we 
have  felt  ourselves  compelled  to  say  on  this  subject,  has  given 
more  pain  to  our  own  minds,  than,we  hope,it  will  ever  give  to  his- 

A  fifth  reason  of  the  unguarded  statement  in  question,  is 
the  assumption  that  a  particular  mode  of  action,  supposes  a 
corresponding  nature  from  which  that  action  is  derived. 
Thus,  it  is  said,  'intellectual  action  presupposes  an  intellect- 
ual nature;  moral  action,  a  moral  nature;  and  of  course, 
sinful  action  implies  a  previously  existing  sinful  nature.' 
The  answer  is  direct  and  obvious.  Intellectual  action  does 
indeed  presuppose  an  intellectual  nature.  But  does  each 
specific /onn  of  intellectual  action  suppose  a  correspondent 
nature  out  of  which  that  form  arises?  Is  a  distinct  mathe- 
matical nature  necessary  to  prepare  the  mind  for  the  study  of 
mathematics;  a  chimical  nature,  for  the  investigations  of  the 
chimist ;  or  a  historical  nature,  for  the  pursuits  of  history? 
So  in  the  case  before  us.  Moral  action  does  presuppose  a 
moral  nature.  But  the  particular  direction  or  form  which 
that  moral  action  takes,  whether  sinful  or  holy,  does  not 
presuppose  a  corresponding  nature.  The  remark  of  Dr. 
Woods,  which  we  have  already  quoted,  happily  illustrates 
this  point.  "The  power  of  choosing  right  or  wrong  makes 
him  (man)  a  moral  agent.  His  actually  choosing  wrong" — 
and  not  a  pre-existing  sinful  nature — "  makes  him  a  sinnek." 

We  shall  mention  only  one  reason  more  for  the  unguarded 
statement  alluded  to;  we  mean  an  erroneous  conception  of 
the  nature  of  moral  agency.     Why  does  the  will  yield  to  the 
47 


370  Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [June, 

power  of  motives?  Every  external  object  which  we  term  a 
motive,  is  addressed  to  some  desire  or  propensity  of  our  nature. 
Does  nature,  or  in  other  words,  does  that  desire  act  upon  the 
will  as  an  efficient  cause,  and  thus  produce  the  choice  of  these 
objects  ?  Mr.  Harvey,  as  we  suppose,  affirms  that  it  does,  and 
condemns  Dr.  Taylor  as  opening  the  flood-gates  of  heresy,  in 
maintaining  a  contrary  opinion.  An  efficient  cause  is  one 
which  exerts  a  positive  influence  to  produce  its  effect.  This 
influence  cannot  be  resisted.  For,  if  it  could  be,  in  any 
instance,  then,  in  that  instance,  it  would  cease  to  be  an  effi- 
cient cause,  since  the  effect  would  not  follow.  Of  course  an  ef- 
ficient cause  is  one,  which  no  exertion  of  power,  in  the  given 
case,  can  hinder  from  producing  its  effect.  Thus  fire  applied 
to  our  bodies  is  an  efficient  cause  of  pain,  and  no  exertion  of 
power  on  our  part,  can  prevent  us  from  feeling  this  sensation 
or  effect.  Now,  we  ask,  is  there  any  propensity  or  nature 
within  us,  which  thus  acts  by  a  direct  efficiency  on  the  will,  and 
which  the  will  has  no  power  to  resist?  Are  our  acts  of  choice 
thus  bound  by  a  fatal  necessity  to  the  impulses  of  our  nature  ? 
Those  impulses  or  propensities  we  did  not  create — we  cannot 
prevent  ourselves  from  feeling  them — and  if  we  have  no  power 
of  the  will  to  resist  them,  if  nature  is,  in  the  words  of  Mr. 
Harvey,  "  the  efficient  cause  of  sin,"  then  the  worst  kind  of 
fatalism  is  established.  We  are  objects  of  divine  anger  and 
liable  to  endless  suffering,  for  acts  of  the  will  which  come 
upon  us  from  a  cause  of  precisely  the  same  kind,  as  that  which 
actuates  the  material  universe  around  us.  Now  Dr.  Taylor  does 
not  believe  this,  and  therefore  he  is  a  heretic  !  He  believes 
that  nature,  or  our  native  propensities,  are  the  ground,  reason, 
or  occasion  why  the  will  chooses — but  not  "  the  efficient  cause." 
He  believes  that,  from  the  commencement  of  moral  agency, 
the  choice  will  in  fact  be  uniformly  on  the  side  of  transgres- 
sion, and  he  accounts  for  the  certainty  and  uniformity  oY this 
fact  as  we  have  done,  when  speaking  of  constitutional  pro- 
pensities as  leading  to  sinful  indulgence.  And  in  these  views 
of  the  will — yes,  and  in  using  the  very  term  "  occasion"  which 
Mr.  Harvey  censures  so  severely — he  has  the  sanction  of  no 
less  an  authority  than  Edwards  himself.  When  that  writer 
says  there  must  be  some  cause  of  every  event,  he  takes  care 
to  apprize  us  that  he  is  not  speaking  oi'  efficient  causes  alone. 
"I  sometimes  use  the  word  cause  in  this  inquiry  to  signify 
-—any  antecedent  with  which  a  consequent  event  is  so  con- 
nected, thiit  it  truly  belongs  to  the  reason  why  the  proposition 
which  affirms  that  event  is  true  ;  whether  it  has  any  positive 
INFLUENCE  Or  uot.  And  in  agreeableness  to  this  [  sometimes 
use  the  word  effect,  for  the  consequence  of  another  thing, 
which  is,  perhaps,  rather  an  occasion  than  a  cause,  most  pro- 


1829.]  on  Human  Depravity.  37 1 

perly  speaking.''''*  Dr.  Taylor,  then,  has  the  authority  of 
Edwards  for  saying  that  a  motive  is  not  a  cause,  nor  an  act  of 
the  will  an  effect,  in  the  strict  sense  of  those  terms.  The 
man  chooses  in  the  view  of  motives.  Those  motives  are  ulti- 
mately founded  on  the  constitutional  propensities  of  our  na- 
ture. Thus  nature  becomes  a  ground,  reason,  or  occasioa 
of  the  choice,  though  not  an  efficient  cause.  This  is  the 
doctrine  of  the  passage  quoted  above  from  Edwards.  In  our 
view  it  is  the  true  foundation  of  the  distinction  between  na- 
tural and  moral  ability  and  inability  ;  and  Dr.  Taylor  stands  on 
the  solid  foundation  of  Edwards,  in  calling  nature  the  "  rea- 
son" or  "  occasion"  of  sin. 

We  have  thus  enumerated,  at  much  greater  length  than  we 
had  originally  designed,  the  principal  reasons  which  have  led 
to  the  unguarded  statement  that  man's  nature  "  is  if se//" sinful," 
previous  to  and  independent  of  any  act  of  choice.  In  doing 
this  we  have  examined  the  fundamental  jarmcipZes  of  Mr.  Har- 
vey's reasoning,  and  have  shown,  if  we  mistake  not,  that  they 
are  founded  in  error.  We  shall  now  pass  to  consider  very 
briefly  some  of  Dr.  Taylor's  arguments  in  proof  that  sin  is 
man's  own  voluntary  act,  together  with  Mr.  Harvey's  objec- 
tions. 

Dr.  Taylor  first  appeals  to  Calvin,  the  Wesminster  Divines, 
Bellamy,  and  Edwards,  and  quotes  passages  which  declare  in 
express  terms,  or  by  necessary  implication,  that  all  sin  is  volun- 
tary. In  reply  to  these  quotations,  Mr.  Harvey  asks,  did  not  the 
authors  of  them  "make  a  distinction  between  native  sin  and 
actual  sin?"  Unquestionably  they  did.  He  then  asks  re- 
specting President  Edwards,  (who  may  serve  as  a  representa- 
tive of  the  others,)  did  he  not  believe  in  the  native  corruption  of 
the  heart ;  and  could  he  then  believe  that  sin  consists  wholly 
in  a  man's  own  act  ?  We  answer  unequivocally  that  he  did 
maintain  both.  He  had  speculated  himself  into  the  notion 
that  "personal  identity  depends  on  an  arbitrary  divine  consti- 
tution"— that  lapse  of  time  makes  no  difference — that  Adam 
and  his  posterity  were  "one  moral  whole,"  with  a  virtual  "co- 
existence of  acts  and  affections. "f  Hence  he  says  expressly 
of  man,  "  the  sin  of  the  apostacy  is  not  theirs,  merely  because 
God  imputes  it  to  them;  but  is  truly  and  properly  Xhit'us,  and 
on  THAT  ground  God  imputes  it  to  them. "J  Such  too  were 
the  views  of  Bellamy,  who  was  a  disciple  of  Edwards.  Mr. 
Harvey  has  endeavored  to  set  aside  his  testimony  that  sinful 
propensities  "  are  in  themselves  native  choice,''''  by  saying  that 
Bellamy  was  endeavoring  to  guard  against  the  idea,  "  that  de- 
pravity was  originally  created  in  man  as  an  essential  property 
of  his  soul."  Be  it  so.    And  how  does  he  guard  against  it  ?  By 

.  *  Works,  V.  54.  Am.  Ed.  t  Works.  VI.  439—40—48.  t  Works,  VI,  468. 


372  Iteview  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [June, 

affirming,  with  Mr.  Harvey,  that  this  depravity  was  "  not  man's 
own  act?"  No;  but  by  saying  in  direct  terms,  that  our  native 
evil  propensities  are  "  the  free,  voluntary,  spontaneous  bent 
of  our  hearts  ;"  though  Mr.  Harvey,  in  quoting  his  words,  has 
unfortunately  omitted  the  word  voluntary,  on  which  the 
whole  force  of  the  passage  turns.  Of  the  Westminster  di- 
vines, too,  Mr.  Harvey  remarks,  that  they  made  a  distinction 
between  original  and  actual  sin.  True.  But  did  they  not 
maintain,  as  Edwards  did,  that  all  our  race  were  one  moral 
person  in  Adam,  and  were  thus  associated  with  him  in  con- 
tracting original  sin?  They  say  expressly,  that  all  mankind 
•'  sinned  in  him,"  and  they  define  original,  as  well  as  actual 
sin,  to  be  a  "  transgression  of  the  righteous  law  of  God." 
Such  too,  appear  to  have  been  Calvin's  views,  as  expressed  in 
Book  H.  of  ins  Institutes  ;  and  such  Mr.  Harvey  apparently 
concedes  them  to  have  been.  "  Man,"  he  says  in  this  pas- 
saire,  (one  quoted  from  Calvin  by  Dr.  Taylor,)  "  is  used  col- 
lectively, meaning  Adam  as  the  head,  and  all  his  race  as  re- 
presented by  him"  When  therefore  Calvin  says  that 
"  sin  is  voluntary" — that  "  native  depravity  can  be  imputed 
to  none  but  man  himself,"  does  he  not  clearly  mean,  that 
"  man  collectively — Adam  and  all  his  race,"  were  voluntary 
as  one  complex  "  moral  whole,"  in  producing  that  "native  de- 
pravity, which  can  be  imputed  to  none  but  man  himself  ?" 
These  notions  of  oneness  with  Adam  are,  indeed,  truly  ab- 
surd. But  as  the  writers  in  question  professed  to  hold  them, 
we  see  how  they  were  consistent  in  saying  that  sin  is  "  man's 
own  act,"  and  yet  that  nature  itself  is  sinful,  previous  to  ac- 
tual sin.  Now  take  away  this  oneness  with  Adam,  and  what 
remains  ?  Precisely  the  statement  of  Dr.  Taylor,  that  sin  is 
man's  own  act,  and  that  "  nature  is  not  itself  sinful." 

We  pass  next  to  consider  what  is  meant  by  "spiritual 
death."  According  to  Dr.  Taylor  it  consists  in  confirmed 
and  actual  sin;  according  to  Mr.  Harvey  it  is  that  "native 
depravity,"  which  is  the  cause  of  actual  sin.  Let  the  apostle 
decide.  "You  hath  he  quickened  who  were  dead" — how? — 
"in  trespasses  and  sins,"  i.  e.  actual  sin,  as  Mr.  Harvey  conr- 
cedcs.  Could  language  more  plainly  declare  in  what  the 
death  consists?  We  say,  for  example,  "I  am  occupied  in 
writing."  Is  the  occupation  the  cause  of  the  writing,  or  rath- 
er does  it  not  constitute  the  occupation?  The  apostle' says 
in  the  second  verse,  "  we  all  had  our  conversation  in  the 
lusts  of  the  flesh."  Was  that  conversation  the  cause  of  those 
lusts,  or  do  tlie  lusts  describe  the  conversation,  and  show  in 
what  it  consisted?  "Ye  are  yet  in  your  sins,"  "walk  in 
love,"  "I  was  m  the  Spirit  on  the  Lord's  day."  Are  the 
"sins,"  the  "love,"  and  the  "Spirit,"  effects,  in  these  cases? 
It  is  too  obvious  to  admit  of  argument,  that  such  expressions 


1829.]  on  Human  Depravity.  373 

do  not  point  out  an  effect,  but  describe  the  condition  or 
state  of  that  with  which  they  are  connected;  and  of  course 
that  "dead  in  trespasses  and  sins,"  is  a  definition  of  spiritual 
death  as  consisting  in  confirmed  actual  sin. 

We  come  now  to  Mr.  Harvey's  direct  arguments  to  prove 
that  sin  exists  previous  to  moral  agency. 

1.  Infants  die.  The  answer  has  been  giren  a  thousand 
times  ;  brutes  die  also.  But  Mr.  Harvey  replies,  "animals  are 
not  subjects  of  the  moral  government  of  God."  Neither  are 
infants,  previous  to  moral  agency ;  for  what  has  moral  gov- 
ernment to  do  with  those  who  are  not  moral  agents  ?  But  Mr. 
Harvey  instantly  shifts  his  ground.  "  Before,  then,  the  objection 
can  have  any  weight,  it  must  be  shown  that  infants  stand  on 
precisely  the  same  ground  with  animals,  that  is  that  they  have 
no  immortal  part,  and  sustain  no  relation  to  the  future."*  It 
has  been  shown  "  that  infants  stand  on  precisely  the  same 
ground  with  animals"  as  far  as  the  present  question  is  con- 
cerned. For  neither  of  them  are  moral  agents  nor  subject  to 
moral  government.  Whether  in  other  respects  they  stand  on 
the  same  ground,  is  aside  from  the  present  inquiry.  That 
inquiry  is,  can  there  be  guilt  or  desert  of  punishment  previous 
to  moral  agency:  but  guilt  belongs  exclusively  to  a  sub- 
ject of  moral  government.  Immortality  in  itself  considered,  has 
.nothing  to  do  with  guilt  or  innocence.  A  brute  or  the  soul 
of  an  idiot  might  live  forever  without  being  sinful.  A  man 
may  be  annihilated  to-moiTow,  but  while  he  continues  in 
existence  he  continues  to  be  a  sinner.  Animals,  and  infants 
previous  to  moral  agency,  do  therefore  stand  on  precisely  the 
same  ground  in  reference  to  this  subject.  Suffering  and 
death  afford  no  more  evidence  of  sin  in  the  one  case  than  in 
the  other.  Why  either  of  them  suffer,  it  is  not  for  us  to  say. 
It  is  obvious,  however,  that  the  laws  of  nature  were  in  many 
respects,  altered  in  consequence  of  the  fall  of  Adam.  The 
ground  has  been  cursed.  The  contact  of  man  with  the  ma- 
terial universe  is  a  perpetual  source  of  danger  or  suffering. 
These  are  the  consequences  of  sin.  But  are  these  laws  to  be 
suspended  the  moment  they  come  in  contact  with  one  who  is 
not  a  moral  agent?  Shall  the  blow  which  crushes  the  mo- 
ther be  arrested  by  a  miracle,  when  it  reaches  the  child  in 
her  arms?  If  such  a  suspension  would  be  proper  in  the  case 
of  any,  we  should  expect  it  in  relation  to  brutes  rather 
than  infants.  The  former  have  but  a  remote  connection 
with  the  sinful  moral  agent.  The  latter  are  "  bone  of  his 
bone  and  flesh  of  his  flesh,"  and  are  themselves  soon  to  rise 
into  all  the  responsibilities  of  moral  agency. 

2.  Why  are  infants  baptized  ?  Because  God  has  permit- 
ted believing  parents  to  place  upon  their  offspring  "  the  seal 
and  token  of  the  covenant."     This  seal  is  the  pledge  and 

*  Page  17, 


:374  Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [June, 

assurance  that  of  those  to  whom  it  is  applied,  God  will  raise 
up  many  "  children  unto  Abraham."  But  is  there  no  signifi- 
cancy  in  the  use  of  the  purifying  element  of  water  in  this  or- 
dinance ?  Certainly.  It  indicates  that  the  being  to  whom  it 
is  applied  will  need  the  purifying  influences  of  the  Holy  Spi- 
rit, from  the  earliest  moment  that  such  influences  in  the  na- 
ture of  the  case  can  take  effect.  But  neither  sin  nor  holiness, 
we  apprehend,  can  be  predicated  of  any  but  moral  agents.* 
The  affecting  truth  is  brought  home  to  every  christian  parent, 
in  dedicating  his  offspring  to  God,  that  nothing  but  almighty 
power  can  save  them  from  pollution  and  final  ruin.  His 
anxieties  and  prayers  are  thus  called  forth  for  the  intervention 
of  the  Spirit  of  grace ;  and  he  is  at  once  urged  and  encou- 
raged to  hold  steadily  before  their  minds,  from  the  dawn  of 
moral  agency,  that  truth  which  the  sacred  Spirit  uses  as  the 
means  of  making  them  wise  unto  eternal  life.  What  greater 
significancy  is  there  in  the  rite  of  baptism,  on  the  scheme  of 
Mr.  Harvey  ? 

3.  Are  children  saved  through  the  death  of  Christ?  In 
our  view,  and  in  the  view  of  Dr.  Taylor  as  expressed  in  his 
sermon,  they  are.  By  salvation,  in  reference  to  those  who  are 
not  yet  moral  agents,  is  meant  deliverance  from  the  future 
existence  and  consequent  punishment  of  sin,  and  a  title  to  eter- 
nal life.  That  infants  dying  before  moral  agency,  will  need 
this  deliverance,  and  this  title,  is  our  belief.  And  the  only 
ground  on  which  either  can  be  hoped  for,  is  that  atonement 
of  Christ  by  which  the  moral  government  of  God  has  been 
sustained ;  the  influences  of  the  Holy  Spirit  secured  for  the 
sanctification  of  God's  elect ;  and  the  unfading  glories  of 
heaven  laid  open  to  those  who  through  grace  are  made  heirs 
of  eternal  life. 

4.  We  pass  now  to  consider  the  scriptural  evidence  addu- 
ced by  Mr.  Harvey.  Psalms  ii.  5.  "Behold  I  was  shapen  in 
iniquity,  and  in  sin  did  my  mother  conceive  me."  Literally 
understood,  this  passage  would  teach  that  sin  existed  previ- 
ous to  our  birth.  It  is,  therefore,  figurative ;  and  expresses 
in  strong  terms  the  cardinal  doctrine,  that  sin  is  not  the  re- 
sult of  circumstances  merely,  but  of  principles  which  belong 
to  the  structure  of  the  soul  itself.  But  we  are  not,  therefore, 
to  infer  that  those  principles   are  in  themselves  sinful. 

Psalm  Iviii.  3.  "  The  wicked  are  estranged  from  the  womb  ; 
they  go  astray  as  soon  as  they  are  born,  speaking  lies."  If  the 
Psalmist  had  not  expressly  added  "  speaking  lies,"  this  passage 
would  have  been  more  to  Mr.  Harvey's  purpose.  But  as  chil- 
dren do  not  "  speak  lies"  from  the  womb,  or  as  soon  as  they 
are  born,  the  conclusion  is  irresistible,  that  these  expressions 
denote  only,  that  sin  commences  at  a  very  early  period — the 

*  The  expression, "sanctified  from  the  womb,"  applied  to  J^emiah,  plainly 
denotes  set  apart  or  dedicated. 


1829.]  on  Human  Bepravity.  oTS 

dawn  of  existence — and  no  account  is  taken,  in  such  general 
statements,  of  the  brief  period  which  intervenes  between  birth 
and  moral  agency.  The  same  is  still  more  obviously  the  case 
with  Gen.  viii.  21.  "For  the  imagination  of  man's  heart  is 
evil  from  his  youth."  Of  all  such  passages,  one  general  re- 
mark may  be  made.  To  the  brief  period  before  moral  agen- 
cy, moral  government  does  not  extend.  Declarations,  there- 
fore, respecting  things  which  belong  to  moral  government, 
are  not  to  be  considered  as  embracing  that  period.  All  lan- 
guage is  to  be  interpreted  by  a  reference  to  the  nature  of  the 
thing  spoken  of.  And  as  the  scriptures  assure  us  that  "  where 
no  law  is  there  is  no  transgression,"  they  forbid  us  to 
apply  any  of  these  declarations  to  a  state  of  being,  where  a 
knovvledge  of  law  cannot  exist.  General  statements  may,  in 
some  instances,  seem  to  extend  to  such  a  state.  In  the  pas- 
sage, "  th(!y  are  all  gone  out  of  the  way,"  no  exception  is  made 
as  to  idiots  or  deranged  persons.  To  make  such  exceptions, 
would  be  to  trifle  with  the  subject.  If  men  will  not  learn  to 
interpret  language  according  to  the  obvious  nature  of  the 
thing  spoken  of,  it  is  in  vain  to  hope  that  any  language  can 
be  guarded  against  perversion.  We  speak  of  a  lion's  whelp 
as  carnivorous,  but  no  one  ever  suspects  us  of  affirming  that 
as  yet  it  subsists  on  flesh.  We  could  not  call  it  carnivorous, 
however,  if  any  doubt  remained — if  it  depended  on  circum- 
stances alone — whether  the  animal  before  us  would  ever  eat 
flesh.  To  justify  this  language,  there  must  be,  in  the  struc- 
ture of  its  frame,  the  ground  of  a  certainty  that  it  will  sub- 
sist on  flesh,  whenever,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  this 
shall  become  possible.  A  ground  of  certainty,  likewise,  ex- 
ists, according  to  Dr.  Taylor,  in  the  mind  of  each  individual 
of  our  race,  that  the  first  and  all  subsequent  acts  of  moral 
agency  will  uniformly  be  sinful,  previous  to  regeneration. 
This  certainty,  in  the  case  of  the  lion,  results  from  the  action 
of  "  an  efficient  cause,"  which  creates  a  natural  and  irresisti- 
ble necessity  of  the  act  in  question.  In  the  case  of  man, 
according  to  Dr.  Taylor,  no  such  necessity  exists.  In  every 
instance  he  could  have  acted  otherwise.  The  certainty  of 
sinning,  therefore,  is  merely  a  moral  certainty,  and  is  depen- 
dent entirely  on  moral  causes. 

Now  there  are  those  who,  oa  the  ground  of  this  certainty 
alone,  are  accustomed  to  speak  of  human  nature  as  itself  sm- 
ful.  By  the  term  "  sinful,"  they  do  not  mean  ''■  deserving  of 
punishment,^''  but  "certainly  resulting  in  sin."  And  we  be- 
lieve that  multitudes  who  imagine  themselves  to  mean  more 
than  this,  will  find  on  examining  closely,  that  this  is  the  whole 
amount  of  their  real  and  practical  faith.  Neither  Mr.  Harvey 
nor  any  other  man,  we  are  confident,  ever  felt  remorse  of  con- 
science for  sin  which  was  not  his  "  own  act."  We  can  no 
more  repent  of  such  sin  than  of  Adam's  first  transgression. 


376  Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [June, 

Those  who  fancy  themselves  to  believe  in  its  existence,  are, 
in  our  opinion,  either  misled  by  ambiguous  language,  or  de- 
luded precisely  as  Hume,  Berkley,  and  Edwards  were  in  their 
speculations.  The  testimony  of  their  consciences,  their  habits 
of  prayer,  and  their  mode  of  striving  against  sin,  will  furnish 
a  complete  demonstration,  we  think,  that  they  truly  and  prac- 
tically believe  "  there  is  no  sin  except  such  as  consists  in 
a  man's  own  voluntary  act.''''  As  to  the  figurative  use  of  the 
terms  "sin,"  "sinful,"  "guilty,"  etc.  to  denote  "certainty" 
of  sin,  and  not  "desert  of  pnisliment,"  we  think  it  unhappy  in 
a  high  degree.  It  is  not  the  true  and  proper  meaning  of  these 
words.  Mankind  at  large  do  not  so  understand  them.  The  use 
of  them  will  bring  a  perpetual  and  unmerited  reproach  on  the 
doctrines  of  Calvinism. 

We  have  examined  at  a  greater  length  than  we  had  origi- 
nally intended,  the  first  position  of  Dr.  Taylor's  sermon,  viz. 
that  sin  is  man's  own  voluntary  act. 

We  pass,  now  to  consider  very  briefly  his  second  position, 
that  "this  depravity  is  by  nature."  The  word  nature,  like 
many  other  terms  of  the  same  class,  is  used  sometimes  in  a 
wider,  and  sometimes  in  a  more  restricted  sense.  We  say, 
for  example,  that  it  is  the  nature  of  a  stone  to  be  heavy.  By 
this  we  imply  two  things,  first  that  the  stone  has  a  certain  in- 
ternal constitution,  and  secondly  that  there  is  in  existence  some 
larger  body  like  the  earth,  towards  which,  in  consequence  of 
that  constitution  the  stone  will  fall.  But  if  the  earth,  and  all 
other  solid  bodies,  were  annihilated,  the  stone  in  question 
would  have  nothing  towards  which  it  could  tend.  It  would, 
therefore,  no  longer  have  the  tendency  in  question.  It  would 
not  be  heavy.  The  internal  constitution  wr>uld  remain  unal- 
tered, but  it  wouid  not  now  be  the  nature  of  the  stone 
to  gravitate  as  it  was  before.  Such  is  the  statement  of 
President  Edwards,  in  very  nearly  the  same  terms  which  we 
have  now  used.  "  It  is  the  nature  of  a  stone,"  he  says,  "to  be 
heavy,  but  yet  if  it  were  placed,  as  it  might  be,  at  a  distance 
from  this  world,  it  would  have  no  such  property."!  When- 
ever we  say,  therefore,  that  any  thing  is  thus  or  thus  by  nature, 
the  internal  constitution  of  the  thing,  is  (in  the  words  of  Ed- 
wards) "considered  together  with  its  proper  situation  in  the 
universal  system  of  existence."  In  other  words  the  internal 
constitution  of  the  stone  is  consid  red  in  connection  with  some 
body  towards  which  it  may  gravitate.  But  if  we  restrict  the 
word  nature  by  some  qualifying  term — if,  for  example,  we 
speak  of  the  nature  of  the  stone  itself,  as  distinguished  from 
its  "proper  situation"  in  the  system  of  existence,  we  now 
mean  its  internal  structure  or  constitution  alone.  This  dis- 
tinction Dr.  Taylor  has  observed  throughout  his  whole  dis- 
course.    When  the  word  nature   is  not  restricted  by  some 

tWorkB,  VI.  150. 


1829.]  on  Human  Depravity.  37T 

qualifying  word,  or  by  the  obvious  scope  of  the  passage,  it 
is  taken  in  its  customary  and  widest  sense,  denoting  the  in- 
ternal constitution  of  the  object  in  connection  with  its  "  pro- 
per situation  in  the  universal  system  of  existence,"  as  Ed- 
wards terms  it ;  or  as  Dr.  Taylor  expresses  it,  "  all  the  appro- 
priate circumstances  of  its  being."  Thus  he  says,  "  a  certain 
tree  by  nature  bears  bad  fruit ;"  meaning  that  in  all  situa- 
tions where  it  can  live  and  bear  fruit  at  all,  (in  all  the  appro- 
priate circumstances  of  its  being)  it  bears  bad  fruit.  Thig 
is  its  nature  in  the  broad  acceptation  of  the  term.  But  in 
many  cases  the  word  nature  in  the  sermon  is  'obviously 
restricted  to  the  constitution  of  the  being  in  question. 
Thus  he  says,  "  nature  is  not  itself  sinful,"  "  such  is  their 
(men's)  nature  that  they  will  sin  and  only  sin,  in  all  the  ap- 
propriate circumstances  of  their  being."  Here  it  would  be 
absurd  to  suppose  that,  after  such  qualificiations,  he  used  the 
word  nature  in  its  widest  sense.  And  in  thus  passing  from 
a  wider  to  a  more  restricted  sense,  as  the  case  may  require, 
he  is  justified  by  the  universal  practice  of  mankind. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  judge  of  the  correctness  of  Dr. 
Taylor's  positions.  "Nature,  he  says,  is  not  itself  sinful." 
Here  the  word  nature  is  expressly  restricted  by  the  word 
*^ itself''  to  the  internal  constitution  of  the  mind,  as  distin- 
guished from  the  appropriate  circumstances.  The  position  then 
corresponds  to  that  of  Edwards,  that  the  stone  is  not  heavy 
when  considered  in  itself,  and  when  withdrawn  from  all  con- 
nection with  the  earth.  "  Mankind  are  depraved  by  nature." 
Here  the  term  nature  is  used  without  restriction  ;  and  the 
meaning  is,  as  in  the  case  of  the  stone,  that  such  is  the  inter- 
nal constitution  of  tiie  human  mind,  that  in  all  situations 
where  man  does  or  will  exist  and  act  as  a  moral  being  be- 
fore regeneration,  he  will  sin.  Although  this  was  obvious 
from  the  term  itself,  Dr.  Taylor  thus  defines  his  meaning. 
"  What  are  we  to  understand  when  it  is  said  that  mankind 
are  depraved  by  nature  ? — I  answer,  that  such  is  their  nature 
(in  the  restricted  sense,  i.  e.  internal  constitution)  that  they 
will  sin  and  only  sin  in  all  the  appropriate  circumstances  of 
their  being."  Thus  explained  the  position  "  mankind  are 
depraved  by  nature,''  and  the  position  "  a  stone  is  heavy  by 
nature,"  express  a  certainty  equally  unlimited  and  absolute. 
They  differ  only  in  this,  that  the  certainty,  in  the  former  case, 
arises  from  moral  causes  and  is  consistent  with  entire  freedom 
of  will  and  power  of  acting  to  the  contrary;  while  in  the  lat- 
ter it  is  produced  by  physical  necessity.  Dr.  Taylor  rests 
the  certainty,  as  Edwards  does  in  the  case  of  the  stone,  on  the 
connection  of  the  internal  constitution  (nature  in  the  restric- 
ted sense)  with  "  the  appropriate  circumstances  of  its  being," 
and  not  on  either  of  them  taken  separatelv.  Mr.  Harvey 
48 


378  Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [June, 

rests  the  certainty  on  the  internal  constitution  alone,  consi- 
dering it  as  an  efficient  cause  and  as  sinful  in  itself.  Armi- 
nianism  rests  the  certainty  on  peculiar  circumstances  of  an 
unfavorable  kind,  so  that  in  other  of  the  appropriate  circum- 
stances of  his  being,  man  would  not  be  sinful.  Now  which 
is  most  consistent  with  the  scriptures  and  experience,  the 
middle  ground  on  which  Dr.  Taylor  has  placed  himself,  in 
accordance  with  Edwards'  meaning  of  the  term,  or  the  ex- 
tremes of  Mr.  Harvey  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  Arminians  on 
the  other  ?  Notwithstanding  Mr.  Harvey's  cavils,  this 
middle  point  is  the  true  ground  of  Calvinism,  when  freed 
from  the   doctrine   of  the  imputation  of  Adam's  sin. 

We  come  lastly  to  consider  the  note  to  Dr.  Taylor's  ser- 
mon, on  the  question  "  for  what  reason  has  God  permitted  sifi 
to  enter  the  universe."  To  this  question  three  answers  might 
be  given. 

1.  God  could  not  prevent  its  existence. 

2.  Moral  beings  must,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  have  the 
power  of  sinning;  and  there  is  no  evidence  that  God  could 
have  over-ruled  that  power  and  entirely  withheld  them  from  its 
exercise,  by  a  direct  interposition  of  his  providence,  and  yet 
have  sustained  a  moral  system  in  existence.  Thus  sin,  as  to 
God's  preventing — not  our  committing  it,  is  a  necessary  inci- 
dent to  a  moral  system. 

3.  God  chose  that  sin  should  enter  the  universe  as  the  ne- 
cessary means  of  the  greatest  possible  good.  Wherever  it  ex- 
ists, therefore,  it  is,  on  the  whole,  better  than  holiness  would 
be  in  its  place.     Onthis  ground  God  permits  its  existence. 

The  first  solution  is  attributed  to  Dr.  Taylor  by  Mr.  Har- 
vey ;  but  in  direct  contradiction  to  the  whole  tenor  and  rea- 
soning of  the  note.  God  could  have  prevented  sin  by  leaving 
moral  agents  out  of  his  creation. 

The  third  solution  has  been  extensively  adopted  by  philo- 
sophers, especially  on  the  continent  of  Europe  ;  and  its  ulti- 
mate reaction  on  the  public  mind,  had  no  small  share,  we 
believe,  in  creating  that  universal  scepticii?m,  which  at 
last  broke  forth  upon  Europe,  in  all  the  horrors  of  the  French 
revolution.  While  the  profoundest  minds  were  speculating 
themselves  into  the  belief  that  sin  was  the  necessary  means 
of  the  greatest  good — better  on  the  whole  in  each  instance, 
than  holiness  would  have  been  in  its  place — common  rnen 
were  pressing  the  inquiry,  "why  then  ought  it  to  be  punish- 
ed." Voltaire  laid  hold  of  this  state  of  things,  and  assu- 
ming the  principle  in  question  to  be  true,  carried  round  its 
application  to  the  breast  of  millions.  In  his  Candide,  one 
of  the  most  amusing  tales  that  was  ever  written,  he  introdu- 
ces a  young  man  of  strong  passions  and  weak  understanding, 
who  had  been  taught  this  doctrine  by  a  metaphysical  Tutor. 
They  go  out  together  into  the  world,  to  "promote  the  great- 


1829.]  tm  Human  Depravity.  .379 

est  good"  by  the  indulgence  of  their  passions  ;  certain  thiat, 
on  the  whole,  each  sin  is  better  than  holiness  would  have 
been  in  its  place.  But  when  Candide  begins  to  sutler  the 
natural  consequences  of  his  vices,  he  feels  it  to  be  but  a  poor 
consolation,  that  others  are  now  reaping  the  benefit  of  his  sin. 
Is  it  surprising  that  such  a  work  induced  thousands  to  disbe- 
lieve in  the  holy  providence  of  God,  and  prepared  multitudes 
to  "do  evil  that  good  might  come  ?" 

It  is  a  serious  inquiry,  then,  is  this  solution  the  true  one  ? 
Ought  we  not  to  have  stopped  one  step  farther  back  ?  Are 
we  sure  that  God  could  have  entirely  withheld  moral  agents 
from  sinning,  and  yet  have  had  a  moral  system  ?  This  is  the 
question  raised  by  Dr.  Taylor  ;  and  so  far  is  he  from  opening 
a  new  career  of  rash  and  fruitless  speculation,  that  his  object 
is  to  recall  past  speculations  to  greater  truth  and  soberness. 
Are  we,  then,  who  are  of  yesterday,  able  so  to  trace  the  re- 
sults in  God's  government  which  is  from  everlasting  to  ever- 
lasting, and  which  comprehends  the  destinies  of  all  worlds, 
that  we  may  hence  establish,  on  a  firm  basis,  the  sentiment, 
that  the  greatest  evil — the  essential  and  only  cause  of  evil, 
is  itself  the  indispensable  means  of  the  greatest  good  ?  Easy, 
indeed,  it  is  to  see  that  if  there  had  not  been  sin,  there  would 
have  been  no  redemption — no  joy  over  repenting  sinners — 
no  display  of  the  riches  of  the  glory  of  God  in  the  pardon  of 
the  guilty.  But  can  we  cast  abroad  our  eyes  over  the  do- 
minions of  God  and  down  the  tract  of  ages,  and  thence  know 
that  there  will  be  more  glory  to  his  name,  and  more  happi- 
ness in  the  universe,  than  there  would  have  been  had  the 
occasion  for  redemption  never  occurred,  but  a  universal 
heaven  had  forever  been  enjoyed  without  it  ?  Surely  we 
cannot.  The  subject  is  removed  infinitely  beyond  our  com- 
prehension. 

The  moral  government  of  God,  in  distinction  from  his 
providential  dominion  has  been  a  subject  of  but  little  discus- 
sion. The  views  of  men  concerning  it  are  apt  to  be  loose 
and  indefinite.  Almost  every  thing  pertaining  to  the  govern- 
ment of  God,  has  been  referred  to  his  physical  agency.  Hence 
it  has  been  inferred  from  his  omnipotence,  as  a  kind  of  axiom, 
that  God  could,  in  a  moral  system,  have  prevented  all  sin. 
This  has  been  supposed  to  result  so  directly  from  his  power, 
that  a  doubt  respecting  it,  has  seemed  to  involve  a  question 
respecting  his  perfection.  Yet  it  is  not  a  limitation  of  his 
power  to  say  that  what  in  the  nature  of  the  case  is  impossible, 
could  not  have  been  done.  And  do  we  know  that,  in  the  na- 
ture of  the  case,  all  sin,  or  the  present  amount  of  sin,  could 
have  been  prevented,  and  yet  a  moral  government  have  ex- 
isted at  all  ?  Plain  it  is  that  if  sin  be  prevented,  this  must  be 
done,  not  by  force  alone,  but  by  a  moral  influence  exerted 
upon   created   minds.     Moral  beings  are  voluntary  beings. 


380  Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [June, 

They  act  under  the  influence  of  motives.  If  they  are  kept 
from  sinning  it  is  not  because  they  cannot  sin,  but  because 
obedience  is  their  choice.  Do  we  know  that  there  must  not, 
in  the  nature  of  the  case,  be  a  display  of  the  feelings  and 
determinations  of  God  in  regard  to  sin,  as  actually  committed, 
in  order  to  the  exertion  of  that  moral  influence,  by  which 
alone  creatures  who  can  sin,  will,  in  all  the  circumstances  of 
their  being,  remain  obedient?  We  do  know  that  the  only 
wise  God  has  taken  occasion  from  sin  to  accumulate  the  in- 
fluences of  his  moral  government  upon  the  minds  both  of 
angels  and  men,  ever  since  time  began.  The  overthrow  of 
Sodom ;  the  judgments  inflicted  upon  Egypt,  and  upon  the 
Israelites,  in  the  wilderness;  his  dealings  with  his  chosen 
people  in  Canaan  and  with  the  surrounding  nations ;  the 
whole  history  of  his  providence,  as  it  is  contained  in  the  bi- 
ble, and  more  especially  the  incarnation,  life,  ministry,  ato- 
ning death,  and  exalted  reign  of  his  own  Son,  are  in  fact, 
and  will  continue  to  be,  the  basis  of  those  means  by  which 
the  Holy  Spirit  convinces,  converts,  and  sanctifies  the  heirs 
of  salvation.  The  existence  of  this  evil  is  pre-supposed  in 
the  system  by  which  God  is  displaying  himself  in  his  bright- 
est glories,  to  the  view  both  of  angels  and  men,  and  bringing 
tlie  whole  weight  of  his  character  to  bear  upon  their  minds, 
to  secure  their  obedience.  And  when  the  whole  shall  be  fin- 
ished and  revealed,  as  it  will  be,  at  the  consummation  of  all 
things,  it  will  afford  such  an  exhibition  of  His  glory,  that, 
as  we  may  reasonably  suppose,  all  his  obedient  subjects, 
throughout  the  universe,  will  be  held  under  its  influence,  in 
iioly  and  joyful  allegiance,  thenceforward  even  forever  and 
ever.  And  do  we  know  of  any  other  way  in  which  the  apos- 
tacy  of  the  subjects  of  a  moral  government,  could  have  been 
prevented  ? 

These  thoughts  are  not  new.  President  Dwight  says, 
"  how  far  the  fall  and  punishment  of  some  moral  beings  may, 
in  the  nature  of  the  case,  be  indispensably  necessary  to  the 
persevering  obedience  of  the  great  body,  cannot  be  deter- 
mined by  us.''*  Sentiments  leading  to  this  conclusion  ap- 
pear also  in  the  sermons  of  Dr.  Strong. f  These  great  men, 
though  perhaps  they  never  distinctly  contemplated  the  sub- 
ject in  the  form  presented  by  Dr.  Taylor,  or  may  have  fallen 
in  with  the  generally  received  notion  respecting  it,  were  yet 
led,  in  reasoning  on  other  topics,  to  thoughts  which  seem  to 
justify  his  conclusion. 

Whatever  assumptions  we  have  been  accustomed  to  connect 
■with  our  speculations  on  the  scheme  of  christian  doctrine,  we, 
are  apt  to  consider  as  essential  to  that  scheme.  The  senti- 
ment that  sin  exists,  not  because  the  Ruler  of  the  world  could 
not  have  prevented  it  in  a  moral  system,  but  because  hepre- 

~*  *  Theol.  Vol.  I.  p.  136.        t  Sermons  Vol.  II.  p.  37. 


1829.]  on  Human  Depravity.  381 

ferred  its  existence  as  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good, 
to  holiness  in  its  stead,  has  so  long  been  adopted  by  Calvinists 
in  their  views  of  his  government,  that  it  may  appear  indispen- 
sable to  their  scheme  of  faith.  Yet  we  apprehend  that  so 
far  from  being  indispensable,  it  goes  rather  to  embarrass  it. 
In  this  bearing  of  the  subject,  although  to  some  of  our  read- 
ers it  will  afford  but  little  entertainment,  and  our  remarks 
have  already  been  too  protracted,  we  wish  to  be  in- 
dulged in  suggesting  a  few  thoughts.  Both  theories  appear 
to  us  consistent  with  the  supreme  natural  perfection,  and  with 
the  sovereign,  universal  and  unchangeable  dominion  of  God. 
Both  suppose  that  He  might  have  prevented  sin.  On  the  the- 
ory of  Dr.  Taylor  it  might  have  been  prevented,  by  not  adopting 
a  moral  system;  on  that  which  he  opposes  by  adopting  another 
moral  system  than  the  present.  Both  theories  suppose  that 
in  a  moral  system,  perfect  and  unchanging  holiness  was  pos- 
sible. The  former  supposes  this,  because  God  has  endowed 
the  subjects  of  his  government  with  the  capacity  of  obedi- 
ence ;  and  because  His  government  embodies  the  most  ef- 
fective influence  that  is  possible  for  this  purpose; — that 
it  is  in  resistance  of  this  influence  that  they  rebel,  and  on 
them  wholly  rest  the  responsibilities  of  the  amazing  evil. 
The  latter  supposes  that  the  agency  of  God  alone  might  have 
been  so  directed  as  to  prevent  all  sin.  Both  suppose  that  in 
a  moral  system,  God  could  have  prevented  each  sin  individu- 
ally considered.  The  former  does  not  deny  that  he  might  have 
done  this  by  a  different  arrangement  of  the  moral  system;, 
while  at  the  same  time  it  supposes  that  this  arrangement  might 
have  been  connected  with  a  greater  amount  of  sin  in  the  ge- 
neral result.  If  the  mighty  works  which  were  done  in  Caper- 
naum, had  been  done  in  Tyre  and  Sidon,  they  would  have  re- 
pented ;  but  what  would  have  been  the  general  consequence 
in  the  history  of  the  world,  cannot  be  known  by  us.  Doubt- 
less the  Creator  might  have  prevented  the  access  of  the 
tempter  to  our  first  parents,  or  have  unveiled  his  true  charac- 
ter ;  or  by  a  divine  influence  have  prevented  their  yielding 
to  his  insinuations.  But  can  we  be  certain  that,  to  have 
broken  the  force  of  the  temptation  in  this  manner,  would  not 
have  begun  a  train  of  events,  leading  inevitably  to  a  more 
hopeless  rebellion  ?  That  there  could  have  been  a  system  of 
moral  government  which  would  have  prevented  all  sin,  or 
the  present  amount  of  sin,  the  one  theory  does  not  assume, 
the  other  does.  Yet  both  acknowledge  the  omnipotence  of 
God,  in  the  most  unqualified  sense  of  that  glorious  attribute. 
*'  On  either  supposition  there  is  what  may  be  called  a  limi- 
tation of  the  power  of  God  by  the  nature  of  things.  In 
the  one  case,  the  limitation  is  supposed  to  result  from  the  na- 
ture of  sin;  in  the  other  from  the  nature  of  moral  agency.*' 
In  both  casesj  however,  the  limitation  of  his  power  consists 


382  tteview  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  [JuNfi, 

rather  in  terms  than  in  reality.  The  difficulty,  if  there  i^ 
one,  results  from  the  imperfection  of  language  or  some 
improper  use  of  it.  For,  when  we  say  on  the  one  hand  that 
God  could  not  prevent  all  sin  in  a  moral  system,  or,  on  the 
other  that  he  could  not  accomplish  the  greatest  good  without 
its  existence,  we  do  not  mean  that  He  was  prevented  by  a  de- 
ficiency of  power,  but  by  the  nature  of  the  case.  No  suppo- 
sable  increase  of  power,  (could  we  imagine  it  to  be  increased) 
would  alter  the  result.  As  far  as  the  intervention  of  God  is 
concerned,  sin  is  necessary,  according  to  both  theories,  to 
the  greatest  good  ;  necessary — not  indeed  in  any  such  manner 
as  infringes  the  moral  agency  of  men — but  on  the  theory  of 
Dr.  Taylor,  because  it  is  necessarily  incidental,  in  respect  to 
the  power  of  God  to  prevent  it  in  his  moral  government,  so 
that  there  could  have  been  no  moral  system  without  it.  On 
the  theory  which  he  opposes,  because  it  is  the  necessary  means 
of  the  greatest  good,  so  that  were  there  less  evil,  the  amount 
of  good  would  also  be  less.  Both  suppositions  also  acknow- 
ledge that  all  events,  sin  not  excepted,  take  place  according 
to  the  eternal  purpose  of  God.  Dr.  Taylor  supposes  Him  to 
have  designed  the  system  in  which  sin  reigns,  and  to  govern 
the  world  according  to  his  designs.  But  not,  so  far  as  we  know, 
because  there  is  aught  in  sin  or  its  necessary  consequences, 
on  account  of  which  He  preferred  it  to  the  universal  reign  of 
righteousness,  but  because  He  foresaw  that  the  subjects  of  a 
moral  government  would  be  liable  to  apostacy,  and  would 
in  many  instances,  whatever  might  be  done  to  prevent  it,  ac- 
tually rebel.  Equally  with  the  other  supposition,  it  ascribes 
to  Him  the  dominion ;  asserts  the  immutability  of  His  coun- 
sel; acknowledges  the  sovereignty  of  His  universal  providence ; 
encourages  prayer;  and  invites  us  to  repose  our  confidence 
in  Him  as  governing  all  things  for  the  attainment  of  the  best 
ends,  and  for  the  complete  security  of  all  who  love  him  :  while 
it  does  not  involve  the  embarrassing  thoughts  inseparable 
from  the  other  supposition,  that  He  has  decreed  all  the  sin 
that  is  committed  and  brings  it  to  pass  as  that,  which,  all 
things  considered,  he  prefers  to  obedience  in  its  stead.  Fi- 
nally both  are  consistent  with  the  infinite  blessedness  of 
God.  The  assumption  that  He  could  have  prevented  sin  in  a 
moral  government,  but  would  not,  supposes  that  sin  itself  is 
necessary  to  His  happiness,  because  the  necessary  means  of 
the  greatest  good  in  his  kingdom.  It  supposes  that  were 
there  less  sin,  were  a  single  sinner  whom  he  has  not  deter- 
mined to  bring  to  repentance,  to  return  to  Him,  as  all  may 
and  ought  to  do,  with  relenting,  saying,  "  Father  I  have  sin- 
ned ;"  and  much  more  were  all  men  to  be  saved  and  come  to 
the  knowledge  of  the  truth,  his  purposes  would  be  painfully 
crossed  and  his  happiness  proportionably  disturbed.  The 
supposition  of  Dr.  T.  does  not  involve  this,  while  yet  it  contem- 


1829.]  on  Human  Bepravity.  383 

plates  Him  as  carrying  into  complete  effect,  a  scheme  of  go- 
vernment calculated  to  produce  the  highest  conceivable  good, 
if  creatures  would  unite  their  agency  with  that  of  God  for  this 
purpose  ; — a  scheme  which  actually  will  produce  the  great- 
est amount  of  good  which  infinite  perfection  can  produce ; 
which  will  afford  a  visible  illustration  of  the  glories  of  the  in- 
visible God;  and  in  which  therefore  he  rests  infinitely  and 
unchangeably  blessed  forever. 

The  assumption  then,  that  God  could  have  prevented  all 
sin  by  a  different  arrangement  of  the  moral  system,  does  not 
seem  to  be  essential  to  our  faith  in  any  of  the  particulars, 
which  had  been  mentioned,  but  involves  it  in  serious  difficult- 
ies. It  presents  too,  we  apprehend,  a  still  greater  embarrassment 
to  our  full  reliance  on  the  sincerity  of  God  in  the  revelation  of 
his  feelings  and  conduct  towards  us,  involved  as  we  are  under 
this  dreadful  evil, — His  sincerity  in  His  declarations,  His  pre- 
cepts, and  His  invitations.  In  llis  declarations,  "  O  that  there 
were  such  a  heart  in  them,  that  they  would  fear  me,  and  keep 
my  commandments  always  !"  "  O  do  not  that  abominable  thing 
which  I  hate!"  "As  I  live,  saith  the  Lord  God,  I  have  no 
pleasure  in  the  death  of  the  wicked,  but  that  the  wicked  turn 
from  his  way  and  live  !"  "Who  will  have  all  men  to  be  saved 
and  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  truth."  Which  supposition, 
we  ask,  is  the  more  evidently  consistent  with  such  declara- 
tions, and  best  lays  open  the  heart  to  their  proper  influence, 
that  which  ascribes  to  God  a  pre/erewce  of  sin,  in  all  the  extent 
of  its  reign,  to  holiness  in  its  stead, — so  that  His  happiness  and 
His  glory  are  necessarily  connected  with  it; — or  that  which  con- 
templates it  as  being  on  no  account  whatever  desired  by  him, 
or  necessary  to  the  accomplishment  of  his  purposes,  except  as 
it  is  his  will  to  maintain  a  moral  government:  which  merely  sup- 
poses the  frailty  incident  to  the  subjects  of  that  government, 
to  be  such,  that  until  His  feelings  in  regard  to  sin  are  exhi- 
bibited  by  answerable  dispensations,  they  will  to  a  fearful 
extent,  be  drawn  to  the  commission  of  it?  In  his  precepts. 
Law  is  an  expression  of  the  will  of  him  who  ordains  it — his 
desire  that  the  subject  do  as  he  is  required — his  preference  of 
that  to  its  opposite.  This  is  the  nature,  the  essential  attri- 
bute, of  law.  It  is  only  as  an  expression  of  the  will  of  the 
sovereign,  that  law  is  designed  to  control  the  will  of  the  sub- 
ject. If  it  is  not  this,  it  is  an  expression  of  nothing  which  the 
subject  is  bound  to  regard,  or  his  regard  to  which  would  be 
obedience.  What  motive  of  obedience  can  we  have  to  per- 
form an  action  required  in  terms,  if  we  do  not  suppose  that  it 
is  the  will  of  the  sovereign  that  we  perform  it ;  and  more  es- 
pecially, if  we  suppose  that,  all  things  considered,  he  would 
be  better  pleased  with  our  doing  the  opposite  ?  Or  what  can 
be  the  intention  or  moral  influence  of  rewards  and  punishments, 
but  to  express  his  satisfaction  with  obedience  and  his  displea- 


384    Review  of  Taylor  and  Harvey  on  Human  Depravity. 

sure  at  disobedience  ?  And  how  can  this  be  reconciled  with 
the  assumption  that  God  prefers  the  transgression  of  his  own 
law,  in  an  infinite  multitude  of  instances,  to  obedience  ? 
In  his  invitations,  "Ho!  every  one  that  thirsteth,  come  ye 
to  the  waters."  "  Whosoever  will  let  him  take  the  water  of 
life  freely."  "  Come,  for  all  things  are  now  ready."  Such 
invitations  coming  from  the  throne  of  the  Eternal  King,  to 
perishing  men,  are  meant  not  for  philosophers  alone,  but  for 
the  poor.  They  are  meant  to  be  taken  according  to  their 
obvious  import.  But  such  invitations  addressed  by  one  man 
to  another  would  express  the  desire  of  acceptance ;  or  cer- 
tainly would  not  include  the  desire  of  their  being  rejected. 
Were  we  fully  apprized  that  a  neighbor,  who  had  invited  us 
to  an  entertainment,  although  for  form's  sake,  or  his  own 
credit's  sake,  or  any  other  reason,  he  chose  to  address  his  in- 
vitation to  us,  and  would  admit  us  on  our  coming,  yet  to  ac- 
complish other  ends  however  laudable,  secretly  preferred  our 
rejection  of  the  invitation,  could  we  regard  him  as  sincere.^ 
Such  language  would  mean,  that  he  wished,  or,  at  least,  was 
willing,  all  things  considered,  that  we  should  come ;  but  his 
heart  would  not  mean  so.  How  then  is  the  sincerity  of  evan- 
gelical invitations  to  be  reconciled  with  the  assumption  of 
God's  preferring  the  rejection  of  them  by  a  multitude  of  those 
to  whom  they  are  addressed,  instead  of  their  being  universally 
received  ? 

In  conclusion,  wo  remark  that  we  have  no  wish  to  establish 
the  contrary  assumption.  We  pretend  not  to  assert,  on  this 
subject,  what  was,  or  was  not  possible  with  God.  Our  ob- 
ject has  been  to  inquire  whether  men  know  as  much  respec- 
tin2  it,  as  some  have  assumed  to  know.  Ought  an  assump- 
tior.  which  so  clogs  the  system  of  revealed  truth,  which  is  not 
essentially  connected  with  ^any  part  of  it,  nor  is  capable  of 
proof  by  other  considerations ,  to  be  retained?  Does  it  give 
to  the  declarations  of  the  Eternal  King  respecting  sin,  to  the 
law  of  his  throne,  or  to  the  invitations  of  his  grace,  that  mea- 
ning— that  subduing  influence,  with  which,  in  their  naked 
forms,  they  would  come  to  the  mind?  Are  we,  whenever  we  ^•, 
go  before  him  in  confession  of  sins,  to  believe  that  he  would  "'"^jf^ 
rather  that  we  had  committed  them  than  not ;  and  that,  how- 
ever he  may  have  remonstrated  with  us  respecting  them,  and 
interposed  his  authority  to  prevent  us,  and  then  by  the  cross 
of  his  Son  intieated  us  to  desist,  still  he  meant  not  so?  Or 
are  we  not  rather  to  yield  ourselves  to  the  unmingled  impres- 
sion, that  we  have  offended  his  holiness,  counteracted  his 
will,  and  outraged  all  his  feelings  of  kindness  towards  us? 
Under  this  impression  we  may  be  subdued — we  may  be 
grieved — we  may — we  must  be  melted  in  contrition  ;  but 
under  the  other  impression  it  is  difficult  to  see  that  we  can 
.review  our  sins  even  with  a  feeling  of  regret. 


